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CONTENTSAbstract
We test the performance of a host of real and ﬁnancial variables as early warning indica-
tors for costly aggregate asset price boom/bust cycles, using data for 18 OECD countries
between 1970 and 2007.
A signalling approach is used to predict asset price booms that have relatively serious
real economy consequences. We use a loss function to rank the tested indicators given
policy makers’ relative preferences with respect to missed crises and false alarms. The
paper analyzes the suitability of various indicators as well as the relative performance
of ﬁnancial versus real, global versus domestic and money versus credit based liquidity
indicators.
We ﬁnd that global measures of liquidity are among the best performing indicators and
display forecasting records, which provide useful information for policy makers interested
in timely reactions to growing ﬁnancial imbalances, as long as aversion against type I and
type II errors is not too unbalanced. Furthermore, we explore out-of-sample whether the
most recent wave of asset price booms (2005-2007) would be predicted to be followed by
a serious economic downturn.
Keywords: Early Warning Indicators, Signalling Approach, Leaning Against the Wind,
Asset Price Booms and Busts, Global Liquidity.
JEL Classiﬁcation E37 · E44 · E51.
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March 2009The recent ﬁnancial turmoil has intensiﬁed the debate on whether central banks should use
policy rates in the build-up to ﬁnancial imbalances in order to ward against booming asset
price developments. The objective would be to dampen the degree of real and ﬁnancial over-
heating both through the standard transmission mechanism and by forcefully signalling to the
public the central bank’s view about growing ﬁnancial imbalances. As a result, the central
bank might more eﬀectively maintain ﬁnancial and price stability in the medium to long run.
So far, one of the main counter-arguments to implement ‘leaning against the wind’ monetary
and/or macro-prudential policies has been that the data do not provide a reliable signal to
act in real time. This is particularly important as it is impossible to identify an asset price
bubble with certainty and many booms simply burst without creating larger problems for
the real economy. Thus policy-makers would need reliable indicators which identify harmful
boom/bust cycles with suﬃcient lead time.
We report some evidence based on the signalling approach developed by Kaminsky, Lizondo
and Reinhart [1998] which is often used to predict foreign exchange and banking crises. A
warning signal is issued when an indicator exceeds a certain threshold, e.g. a particular per-
centile of its distribution.
We ﬁrst deﬁne aggregate asset price booms (based on a price index consisting of weighted
real private property, commercial property and equity prices) across 18 OECD countries using
quarterly data between 1970 and 2007. Asset price booms are identiﬁed for each country and
a high-cost boom is deﬁned as a boom that is followed by a three-year period, in which overall
real GDP growth was at least three percentage points lower than potential growth.
We test a set of ﬁve real variables and 13 ﬁnancial variables, and up to six diﬀerent trans-
formations of these variables - overall 89 indicators - to ascertain their suitability as early
warning indicators for high-cost asset price boom/bust cycles within a six-quarter forecasting
horizon.
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March 2009fulness for the policy maker, which depends on her relative aversion against missed crises as
opposed to false alarms. Furthermore, in this paper the performance of the indicators is based
on signals as they would have been obtained in the period they refer to.
The results reveal that over the average of all countries and in the case of many preference
parameters the global M1 gap and the global private credit gap are the best early warning
indicators. Interestingly, the best indicators are global variables, which can be explained by
t h ef a c tt h a ta s s e tp r i c eb o o m / b u s tc y c l e sa r elargely international phenomena. The best
indicator for a policy maker who is only slightly more averse against false alarms than missed
crises, is the global private credit gap. In terms of the absolute performance using the optimal
70% percentile across countries predicted on average 95% of high-cost booms by issuing a sig-
nal in at least one of the six preceding quarters. The share of correct signals as a percentage
of periods in which a high-cost boom actually developed within the following six quarters is
82%. The share of false alarms as a percentage of periods in which no high-cost boom followed
is 32% and the average lead time for the ﬁrst warning signal is 5.5 quarters.
The performance of the liquidity indicators can be further improved by deﬁning a signal to be
issued only when two indicators simultaneously exceed their respective thresholds, which, in
particular, reduces the proportion of false alarms.
Finally, we are interested in conﬁrming whether the asset price booms, which started in the
mid-2000s, are predicted to be high-cost booms. In order to do so, we counted the warning
signals issued by the two best indicators in the 11 quarters between the ﬁrst quarter of 2005
and the third quarter of 2007. With respect to the global private credit gap, the optimal 70%
threshold was breached in seven quarters, thus showing a clear and persistent warning signal.
Global M1, however, provided no signal at its optimal 90% threshold.
The results show that it is possible to identify early warning indicators for individual countries
and also groups of countries which perform reasonably well. Nevertheless, as recent events
show, indicators that have historically performed nearly equally well can provide diﬀerent
messages. Signals obtained should thus be interpreted carefully and should only be regarded
as one of several inputs in the information set of decision-makers.
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The recent ﬁnancial crisis has intensiﬁed the debate whether changes in regulatory policies
and monetary policy should be actively used in the building up phase of ﬁnancial imbalances
in order to contain asset price booms and bubbles. With respect to monetary policy, the
pertinent question is whether central banks should ‘lean against the wind’ of a sustained and
swift upward movement in asset prices, which is considered unsustainable and bears the risk of
a possibly abrupt future correction. An asset price bust can have serious negative consequences
for the real economy and in case of ﬁnancial instability it will complicate the central bank’s
task to maintain price stability. Indeed, in such a situation uncertainty about the prevailing
transmission mechanism would increase and in the worst case transmission could get seriously
impaired.
It is worth highlighting three major knowledge gaps with respect to the current debate on
‘leaning against the wind’ policies.
First, it is not exactly clear through which channel tightening monetary policy in times of
excessively low risk aversion would be successful in dampening an asset price boom. Recently
though more and more empirical evidence as well as theoretical arguments have been produced
directly or indirectly supporting the ‘leaning against the wind’ proposition. There is growing
empirical evidence on the existence of a risk-taking channel.1 Banks seem to take on more
risk in times of persistently low interest rates even after controlling for the cyclical net worth
of borrowers and the endogeneity of monetary policy.2 Furthermore, it has been shown that
small increases of the policy rate could possibly break herding behavior of private investors, if
the policy move is interpreted as a credible signal of the central bank’s information/analysis
on the state of the economy.3 Another potentially important channel in favor of a ‘leaning
against the wind’ policy is the increased symmetry in central banks’ responses with respect
to boom and bust periods, which would reduce moral hazard.4
1While Rajan [2005] introduced the channel, Borio and Zhu [2007] coined the term.
2See Jiménez et al. [2007].
3See Loisel et al. [2008]. Hoerova et al. [2008] explore a similar channel.
4See Diamond and Rajan [2008].
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under all conditions bad for the long run growth path of the economy. There is some evidence
that the increase in collateral value during asset price booms alleviates ﬁnancing constraints
as long as the boom lasts, which could more than compensate for the recession during the
bust phase. This evidence though has only been provided for middle income countries and is
unlikely to hold for countries with well developed ﬁnancial markets.5 But the general issue
how much ﬁnancial instability should be accepted in order to best exploit the long run growth
potential remains an open question. The answer is likely to be country and time dependent.
Third, there is some scepticism in the academic and central banking community whether
asset price bubbles can be identiﬁed in real time in order to allow policy makers to react.6
On the other hand, it might not be necessary to come to a ﬁrm conclusion whether particular
asset price movements are fundamentally justiﬁed or not in the ﬁrst place.7 Adalid and Detken
[2007] pursue such an agnostic approach and derive in sample characteristics of costly asset
price booms, where booms are simply deﬁned as unusually swift and persistent asset price
increases compared to trend.8 This paper provides new evidence that early warning indicators
exist which signal costly asset price developments in ‘real time’ and with suﬃcient lead to react.
This paper provides no further arguments with respect to the debate to which degree mon-
etary policy or regulatory and supervisory measures are suited to address growing ﬁnancial
imbalances - most likely they will have to complement each other in the sense that monetary
policy will be the backup-solution to lacking or ineﬃcient regulatory and supervisory action.
But in both cases, reliable and timely warning signals are a necessary requirement for any
policy aiming at tightening the screws during pre-boom and early boom periods.
The timeliness of the topic of early warning indicators with respect to asset price cycles
is also revealed by the ongoing discussions for a new international monetary and ﬁnancial
5See Rancière et al. [2008].
6Kohn [2008] mentions this as one of the key challenges casting doubt on the feasibility of ‘leaning against
the wind’.
7See Adrian and Shin [2008a].
8Borio and Lowe [2002], [2004] and Borio and Drehmann [2008] provide evidence that detrended asset prices
can serve as indicators for banking crises.
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ber, 2008 in Brussels concluded that “an early warning system must be established to identify
upstream increases in risks or the formation of bubbles in the valuation of diﬀerent economic
assets”.
More precisely, this paper aims at answering four questions. First, do we have indicators,
which when used in the simplest early warning indicator (signalling) approach, provide useful
information to decision makers in a timely manner? We attempt to answer this question using
historical data but in an as realistic as possible ‘real-time’ experiment. Second, are ﬁnancial
or real indicators more useful in predicting costly asset price cycles? Third, considering the
information content in ﬁnancial variables, are global or domestic indicators better suited to
provide early warning signals? And fourth, do money or credit based liquidity indicators show
a superior performance in predicting costly asset price boom/bust cycles?
With respect to deciding on what is an acceptable performance for an indicator we go
beyond the standard way of searching for indicators with noise to signal ratios below 1, but
take into account the preferences of policy makers, i.e. their relative aversion with respect to
type I and type II errors.9 Our approach results in a much tougher criterion to assess the
usefulness of the indicators.
Section 2 introduces the signalling approach as in Kaminsky et al. [1998] and applied to
banking crises in Borio and Lowe [2002],[2004] and Borio and Drehmann [2008] but adds some
further elements of ‘real time’ evaluation and an alternative measure evaluating the usefulness
of indicators.
In Section 3 we outline the method to deﬁne the events to be predicted, which are costly
aggregate asset price booms. The asset price index consists of weighted real private property,
commercial property, and equity prices for 18 OECD countries using quarterly data between
1970 and 2007 provided by the Bank for International Settlements.
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we apply to derive overall 89 indicators, which we evaluate with respect to their forecasting
performance. In particular, we include variables which have previously been found to explain
real eﬀects following asset price boom/bust cycles.10
Section 5 presents the results of the forecast evaluation and addresses the four questions
raised above. We also investigate to which degree joint indicators improve the performance
over single indicators as in Borio and Lowe [2002].
Section 6 uses the best indicators to analyze out-of-sample whether the most recent wave of
asset price booms in the 2005-2007 period had been predicted to be high cost, as they cannot
yet be classiﬁed as high or low cost on the basis of post boom GDP data.11
Section 7 concludes. The results reveal that over the average of all countries and for a wide
range of preference parameters the global private credit gap and the global M1 gap are the best
early warning indicators.12 The forecast performance is such that the approach should provide
value added to policy makers contemplating leaning against growing ﬁnancial imbalances -
either by means of monetary or macro-prudential policies - as long as their preferences are
relatively balanced between missed crises and false alarms. With respect to the latest boom
wave around 2005-2007, the global private credit gap has been sending persistent warning
signals while the global money (M1) gap has not.
2 ‘Real Time’ Signalling Approach and Risk Aversion
We use the signalling approach as described in Kaminsky et al. [1998] and Kaminsky and
Reinhart [1999], which has frequently been employed to predict foreign exchange and banking
crises, but to our knowledge not for predicting asset price boom/bust episodes. While most
banking crises are preceded by asset price cycles, not all asset price cycles lead to banking
crises. The deﬁnition of a banking crisis is also less straight-forward as it might appear at ﬁrst
10See Adalid and Detken [2007].
11Borio and Drehmann [2008] evaluate the performance of their indicators with respect to the 2007/09
banking crisis and show how it depends on the deﬁnition of banking crisis.
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failure of at least one bank or already by the provision of central bank emergency liquidity
assistance and/or a government bail-out or the provision of government guarantees for at least
one bank. Some banking crises have large, some low GDP costs, but most importantly there
are relatively few banking crises around. The advantage of studying asset price cycles is that
there is a suﬃcient number of them and one can also explore the characteristics of the group
of relatively more costly compared to the less costly cycles.
The signalling approach is one of the two threshold approaches using a binary explanatory
variable. The other approach is the discrete-choice (probit/logit) model.13 In the signalling
approach a warning signal is issued when an indicator exceeds a threshold, here deﬁned by a
particular percentile of an indicator’s own distribution. This approach assumes an extreme
non-linear relationship between the indicator and the event to be predicted.
Each quarter of the evaluation sample for each indicator falls into one of the following
quadrants of the below matrix.
Costly Boom/Bust Cycle No Costly Boom/Bust Cycle
(within 6 quarters) (within 6 quarters)
Signal issued A B
No signal issued C D
A is the number of quarters in which an indicator provides a correct signal, B the number
of quarters in which a wrong signal is issued. Correspondingly, C is the number of quarters the
indicator does not issue a signal despite a costly boom/bust cycle starting within the following
six quarters. D is the number of quarters in which the indicator does not provide any warning
signal, and rightly so.
A/(A + C) is the number of good signals as a ratio to all quarters in which a costly
boom/bust cycle followed within six quarters. B/(B + D) represents the share of bad signals
13See Chui and Gai [2005] for a survey and Edison [2003] for relevant discussions.
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share of type II errors (event not occurring but signal issued, as share of B + D)o rs i m p l y
the share of false alarms. Correspondingly C/(A + C) is labeled the share of type I errors
(event occurring but no signal issued, as share of A + C) or simply the share of missed costly
boom/bust cycles.
Kaminsky et al. [1998] and the literature following their seminal contribution assess the
usefulness of an indicator by computing the adjusted noise to signal ratio (aNtS) deﬁned as
[B/(B + D)]/[A/(A + C)]. A useful indicator is supposed to have an aNtS of less than 1. A
value of 1 would result if an indicator provides purely random signals.
The criterium of aNtS < 1 though is only a necessary condition for an indicators’ usefulness
in practice, as a) the resulting type I and type II errors might be unacceptable to policy makers
given their preferences and b) the gain associated with receiving signals from an indicator as
compared to ignoring it, which also depends on preferences, might be irrelevant.
We deﬁne a loss function for the policy maker, a central banker in this case, to analyze the








θ is the parameter revealing the policy maker’s relative risk aversion between type I and type
II errors. The loss can be easily interpreted. It is the preference weighted sum of type I and
type II errors. A θ lower than 0.5 reveals that the central banker is less averse towards missing
a signal for a costly asset price boom/bust cycle than towards receiving a false alarm.15
14Bussière and Fratzscher [2008] introduce the loss function approach to the early warning indicator liter-
ature. Their loss function diﬀers from ours as it assumes that policy makers receive disutility from missing
crisis (C) and receiving a signal (A + B) irrespective whether the signal is correct or wrong.
15We believe a θ smaller than 0.5 is a realistic description of central bankers’ loss functions, although the
recent ﬁnancial crisis might have increased the average θ. If asset price booms are not discovered as such in a
timely manner or the monetary policy strategy does not foresee reacting to asset price developments beyond
the impact of asset prices on consumer price inﬂation at traditional forecast horizons, there always remains
the possibility to smooth the bust phase by means of a very accommodative monetary policy stance and by
providing liquidity (to the market or individual banks). On the other hand, a central banker would certainly
have to cope with serious public pressure when being found out to have spoiled the party while relying on a
false alarm. Furthermore, even if the indicator performed well and provided a correct signal and the central
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min[θ;1− θ] − L. (2)
A central banker can always realize a loss of min[θ;1−θ] by disregarding the indicator. If θ is
smaller than 0.5, the benchmark is obtained by ignoring the indicator, which amounts to never
having any signals issued so that A = B =0 . The resulting loss according to eq. (1) is θ.I f
θ exceeds 0.5, the benchmark for the central bank is assuming there is always a costly boom
developing, i.e. assuming a signal is always issued so that C = D =0 . The resulting loss is
1−θ. An indicator is then useful to the extent that it produces a loss lower than min[θ;1−θ]
for a given θ.
Another diﬀerence to the standard literature using the signalling approach is that the
performance of the indicators reported here is based on a ‘real time’ analysis. Indeed, at
each point in time we set the thresholds for the indicators on the basis of past observations.
Trends are calculated recursively only using available data up to each point in time. Therefore
we obtain signals as they would have been obtained in the period they refer to. There is
though one notable exception and one caveat. The percentiles of the distribution, beyond
which a warning signal is issued, are optimized ex-post for each indicator using all relevant
boom/bust cycles in the evaluation sample between 1979 and 2002. Unfortunately, a strictly
real time approach, i.e. choosing the optimal percentile of the distribution at each point in
time, is not feasible. Indeed, we would need to have, at each point in time, at least one past
costly asset price boom/bust cycle, in order to evaluate the indicator’s performance. In our
approach, the speciﬁc indicator thresholds for each quarter are derived by applying the ﬁxed
optimal percentile to the distribution of the data available up to each speciﬁc point in time.
Thresholds for each indicator are thus time and country dependent. The caveat is that we
use the most recent vintage of data and not a true real time data set with unrevised data.
Nevertheless, we use conservative lags to proxy for standard publication lags and thus real
time data availability. Publication lags are particularly important for housing prices and vary
across countries, as will be discussed in Section 4.
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We start by mechanically deﬁning asset price boom episodes for 18 OECD countries16 between
1970:Q1 and 2007:Q4. The real aggregate asset price indices have been provided by the
Bank for International Settlements and are weighted averages of equity prices, residential and
commercial real estate prices, and are deﬂated with the national consumption deﬂators.17 An
aggregate asset price boom is deﬁned as a period of at least three consecutive quarters, in which
the real value of the index exceeds the recursive trend plus 1.75 times the recursive standard
deviation of the series. The recursive trend is calculated with a very slowly adjusting Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter (λ = 100000) taking into account only data up to the respective quarter.18 The
value of 1.75 is the one preferred by Mendoza and Terrones [2008] in identifying credit booms.
1.75 also provides results which are relatively comparable to the boom identiﬁcation reported
in Adalid and Detken [2007].19
We then diﬀerentiate between aggregate asset price booms, which have little consequences
for the real economy and those that have signiﬁcant eﬀects. The deﬁnition of a high-cost boom
(HCB) is chosen in a way to reasonably split our sample of 45 booms, for which we have three
years of post-boom GDP data, into two groups so that the low-cost booms (LCB) can function
as control group.20 We deﬁne a high-cost boom as a boom, which is followed by a three year
period in which overall real GDP growth has been at least three percentage points lower than
potential growth. The choice of 3 percentage points over three years lower than potential is
16The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States.
17We use aggregate instead of individual asset class price indices as we are also interested in growing ﬁnancial
imbalances which could potentially be addressed by means of timely adjustments to the monetary policy stance.
As the interest rate is a relatively blunt tool aﬀecting the whole range of asset prices, it is more likely to be
used in episodes when a boom is identiﬁed in an aggregate index.
18A similar method has previously been used in Gourinchas et al. [2001] and Borio and Lowe [2002]. Also
in Detken and Smets [2004] and Adalid and Detken [2007] the price index needs to exceed 10% of its slowly
adjusting recursive trend in order for a quarter to qualify as potential boom quarter. In this paper instead, we
identify booms using country speciﬁc information with respect to the volatility of asset prices, which should
give a better picture of what can be considered unusually swift asset price developments for each country. See
also Mendoza and Terrones [2008] for a discussion of alternative methods.
19The examples in Mendoza and Terrones [2008], their Figures 4 and 5, show that the main diﬀerence in
this class of boom identiﬁcation methods derives from the choice of country speciﬁc standard deviations versus
ﬁxed percentage thresholds to compute deviations from trends, rather than the choice of λ to compute the
recursive trend. Nevertheless, we also derived all results of the paper when deﬁning booms by a ﬁxed larger
than 10 percentage point deviation from trend without major qualitative changes.
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March 2009close to the median of post boom losses, which is 3.5 p.p.. In this way we divide our sample
of 45 classiﬁable (out of 60 identiﬁed) booms into 29 high-cost and 16 low-cost booms. Figure
1 shows the identiﬁed boom periods. High-cost boom quarters are depicted in black, low-cost
booms are grey and framed periods are unclassiﬁed booms. The quarters marked by xxx
in Figure 1 are periods in which the asset price index breaches the boom threshold.21 This
reveals that in some cases we classiﬁed two boom episodes which closely followed each other
as one boom and thus bridged a few periods of asset prices below the trend plus 1.75 standard
deviations. Otherwise the post boom period of the earlier boom would have overlapped with
the boom period of the later boom.22 Furthermore, in two cases we artiﬁcially ended the boom
periods (Finland and Sweden in 2000Q3) after the aggregate asset price gaps had been falling
by more than 35 percentage points compared to their respective peaks. It is reassuring that
all banking crises with signiﬁcant GDP costs as identiﬁed by Honohan and Laeven [2005], i.e.
Finland 1991-1994 (-21% of GDP), Italy 1990-1995 (-22% of GDP) and Sweden 1991-1994
(-11% of GDP), are following high-cost booms according to our identiﬁcation scheme.
Figure 2 provides a diﬀerent perspective on the boom classiﬁcation results. It shows the
number of countries experiencing aggregate asset price booms at each point in time. There
have been basically three major waves of asset price booms since the 1980s. In terms of the
number of countries aﬀected, the ﬁrst wave peaked in 1989, the second in 2000 and the third
in early 2007. While the ﬁrst wave of cycles were all high-cost booms, only about 60% of the
second wave has been classiﬁed as such. Concerning the third wave the verdict is still open.
21There is one exception to the high/low-cost classiﬁcation scheme, which is the boom identiﬁed for Japan
between 1987 and 1989. According to our deﬁnition it would be a low cost boom with aggregate GDP growth
1.7 percentage points below potential over the following three years. But as this boom triggered the ‘lost
decade’ with losses of 48% of GDP occurring after our reference period, we nevertheless classiﬁed this boom
as high cost.
22The longest bridged period is 6 quarters, see Figure 1.
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March 2009Figure 1: Identiﬁed boom periods. In those periods highlighted with xxx the real value of the index exceeds
the recursive trend plus 1.75 times its recursive standard deviation. Grey indicates low-cost booms, black
indicates high-cost booms while the others are non classiﬁed booms. The ﬁrst column indicates with X those
quarters in which the detrended Global Private Credit to GDP ratio (GlobPC-HP) issues warning signals (with
threshold at the 70th percentile).
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Low Cost or Unclassified Booms4 Data and Indicators
We test a set of 18 real and ﬁnancial variables, and up to 6 diﬀerent transformations of these
variables - overall 89 indicators - on their suitability as early warning indicators for high-cost
asset price boom/bust cycles within a 6 quarter forecasting horizon. Variables related to the
real side of the economy are GDP, consumption, investment and housing investment (all in
real terms). Financial variables are consumer price deﬂated equity, housing and aggregate
asset prices, the term spread, real eﬀective exchange rates, real and nominal 3-months interest
rates and 10 year bond yields, real M1, real M3, real private credit and real domestic credit.
Furthermore we correct real money and credit growth rates from endogenous business cycle
and asset price components by means of recursive VAR models.23 In addition, we also evaluate
consumer price inﬂation. Furthermore, we test GDP (at PPP) weighted averages of the 18
countries of seven ﬁnancial variables (private credit, M1, and M3 all as ratios to GDP, nominal
short rates, and the VAR shocks for M1, M3 and private credit growth), which we label global
ﬁnancial variables. The legend in the Annex provides the information necessary to read the
tables in the following sections.
We compute several transformations of the variables in order to check for their forecasting
performance. Variables are used (if applicable) as year on year growth rates (yoy), six quarter
cumulated growth rates (cum), deviations (‘gaps’) from a recursive slowly adjusting HP trend
(detr and HP24), deviations from a slowly adjusting HP trend of the ratio to GDP (toGDP-
detr and toGDP-HP) and levels (lev). For housing prices we use seasonally adjusted as well
as non-seasonally adjusted data, taking into account the established seasonal patterns.25 All
other variables, except aggregate asset prices, equity prices, exchange rates and interest rates
are seasonally adjusted.
In order to proxy for data availability at the time decisions have to be taken, we generally
23See Adalid and Detken [2007], for a description of the methodology to derive these shocks. Here though
we estimate the VARs recursively to mimic real time data availability and use six quarter moving averages of
the derived shocks.
24T h et i m es e r i e sf o rdetr and HP are the same. The diﬀerence is that in order to derive the threshold at
each point in time when applying the optimal percentile, past values are treated diﬀerently. For detr variables,
the optimal percentile is applied to the series of recursively detrended variables without updating the trend
for past periods. For HP variables the optimal percentile is applied to past detrended series obtained when
updating the trend at each point in time, so that also the history of the indicator changes as time elapses.
25See Ngai and Tenreyro [2008].
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quarter with variables lagged by one quarter. This might bias the results against ﬁnancial
variables, as in reality the latter often have a much shorter publication lag if any at all, so
that at least a reasonable approximation for the current quarter would usually be available.
Housing price indices are diﬀerent though. For some countries, private residential housing
prices are available only annually or biannually and publication lags vary signiﬁcantly. Given
the country speciﬁc information we collected, the following lags are applied in the analysis:
most countries housing and aggregate asset price indices are applied with a one quarter lag,
except France, Italy, Japan and Denmark for which we use two quarters and Germany which
is lagged four quarters.
Comparing our set-up with the series of papers by Borio and coauthors, the following main
diﬀerences should be highlighted. For the same set of countries, we are predicting costly asset
price cycles and not banking crises, so that compared to Borio and Lowe [2004] and Borio
and Drehmann [2008] we evaluate 24 (plus a control group of additional 10) instead of 15 and
13 events, respectively. A distinction is also relevant with respect to the analyzed lead time,
which is set up to 6 quarters in our case and varies between 1 and 5 years for the BIS papers.
This makes sense noting that booms tend to precede banking crises. Also notice that only
Borio and Lowe [2004] also use quarterly data (1974-1999) like in this paper, while otherwise
annual data are employed. Only Borio and Drehmann [2008] also use property prices. More
generally, the main diﬀerences are the loss function criterium introduced in section 2 to rank
indicators, the broader set of reported indicators which also include global variables and the
choice to deﬁne thresholds in terms of percentiles rather than absolute values.
Details about our data sources can be found in the Annex.
5R e s u l t s
In order to compare the forecasting performance for high-cost boom episodes within a six
quarter horizon for our 89 indicators we proceed as follows. In a ﬁrst step we optimize
the percentile to calculate the thresholds for each indicator for each individual country by
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of [0.05−0.95] in steps of 0.05. We compute a ranking of the 89 indicators for diﬀerent values
of θ ( 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 and 0.8). Note that the optimal percentile is derived ex-post
by using all available high-cost booms per country, but the threshold varies in time as the
percentile is applied to quarterly updated distributions of the indicator as time passes. This
time variation of the threshold is taken into account during the optimization of the percentile.
The evaluation period is 1979:Q1 to 2002:Q1. We begin the evaluation only in 1979 as we
need some starting window in order to compute reasonable initial trends and to estimate the
initial VARs. Furthermore, we cannot evaluate yet the last boom wave, as we do not have
three years of post boom GDP data. There are thus 24 high cost booms (and 10 low-cost
booms) left in the evaluation window.
When we compute the resulting ﬁgures for A, B, C and D of the matrix shown in Section
2, we exclude boom periods as of the fourth consecutive quarter from the evaluation, as by
then a warning signal is not really useful anymore and it might not be advisable to mix early
warning signals with signals during an established boom episode.
In the tables presented in this paper indicators are ranked by their usefulness for the policy
maker as deﬁned above in eq. (2). In some tables we will follow Kaminsky et al. [1998] and
also present a few other standard evaluation measures like the aNtS ratio and its two com-
ponents A/(A + C) and B/(B + D).T h ebooms column reveals the percent of booms which
is predicted in one of the six quarters preceding the boom or during the ﬁrst three quarters
of the boom. The probability of the event conditional on a signal being issued is A/(A + B).
The diﬀprob column shows the diﬀerence between the conditional (on a signal being issued)
and unconditional probabilities of the event, i.e. A/(A+B)−(A+C)/(A+B+C +D).T h e
larger this probability diﬀerence the better the indicator, but it must at least be positive for
an indicator to be potentially valuable. We also report the average lead time of an indicator
in the ALT column, which is the average number of leading quarters by which an indicator
has been signalling an event for the ﬁrst time. And ﬁnally, we report the persistence of the
signal, which is nothing else than the inverse of the aNtS ratio, labelled pers. This number
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March 2009can be interpreted as the factor by which a signal is issued more persistently in times of grow-
ing imbalances (i.e. costly boom/bust cycle starting within 6 quarters) compared to tranquil
times. A persistence value larger than 1 is a necessary condition for an indicator to be useful.
Instead of reporting country by country results, we show averages for two groups of coun-
tries. The ﬁrst is the simple average over the 18 countries and the second a GDP weighted
average of the eight euro area countries in our sample by using optimal country speciﬁc thresh-
olds for each indicator. Annex Tables 1 and 2 show the results for all 89 indicators for θ =0 .4
for both groups of countries. For the average over all countries (Annex Table 1) the best indi-
cators are cumulated real consumption growth over 6 quarters, the nominal long term interest
rate gap26 and the real equity price gap, all producing preference weighted errors (i.e. the loss,
not shown) of about 22-23%. With a θ of 0.4, the usefulness for the policy maker is 0.18-0.17.
The interpretation is that on average over the 18 countries the preference weighted errors can
be reduced by 17-18% compared to the loss resulting if the indicator would be disregarded.
The standard evaluation measures look very reasonable, with the aNtS around 0.3 and an
average lead time of about 5.7 quarters. The best indicators for the euro area average (Annex
Table 2) are the global private credit gap (detr and HP), the nominal long term interest rate
gap and the M1/GDP ratio gap with similar properties as for the overall average, i.e. losses of
22% and aNtS around 0.26. One major diﬀerence between the results for all countries and for
(weighted) euro area countries is that while for the former there are both real (in particular
consumption and investment) as well as ﬁnancial indicators among the best performing ones,
ﬁnancial variables dominate for the euro area average.
In order to derive optimal percentiles and thresholds for the euro area, the above results on
average performance with country speciﬁc percentiles might not be particularly useful though.
An indicator may be good for one country and perform very badly for another. As optimal
domestic percentiles vary, it is not clear which percentile one would have to select for the
euro area. In case one would take the average or weighted average percentile, the previously
26Interest rates are entered with a negative sign. This means that rates above e.g. the 85% quantile are the
15% lowest interest rates.
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We therefore repeat the exercise of optimizing the percentiles, per indicator, for all the dif-
ferent values of θ by imposing that the percentile has to be the same for all countries or
alternatively for all euro area countries in the sample. The common percentile chosen is the
one which minimizes the aggregate loss over all countries or the weighted aggregate loss for
the euro area countries. We also average the evaluation statistics derived with the common θ.
Results obtained by forcing the same percentile to be applied across countries should provide
more useful information for selecting the optimal percentile for aggregate euro area data in
the future. Whether it is more advisable to rely on the larger sample of 18 but more diverse
countries or rather on the (weighted) average of 8 euro area countries is debatable, which is
why we present again results for both groups of countries. Using euro area data directly is
not advisable at the current stage, as we might be left with only 1 or 2 episodes (2 only if we
would use aggregated national data to proxy for the euro area before 1999) in our evaluation
window, see Figure 2.
Annex Tables 3-5 show the full set of results for three diﬀerent θ (0.2, 0.4 and 0.6) obtained
with a common percentile. Annex Tables 6-8 present the result for the weighted average of
euro area countries. The optimal percentile as well as the coeﬃcient of variation of the country
speciﬁc optimal percentiles are also mentioned in these tables. The cross-country variation
in optimal percentiles is valuable information with respect to the problems associated with
choosing a common percentile for the euro area.
Figure 3 visualizes one particular example (global M1 gap (detr), constrained euro area
percentile) of how the optimal trade-oﬀ of policy makers depends on relative preferences. Pol-
icy makers’ preferences, i.e. the aversion to missing a boom/bust cycle relative to receiving
false alarms as measured by θ, is depicted on the X-axis. Type I errors (missed high-cost boom
as percentage of periods in which a high-cost boom followed within 6 quarters, C/(A + C))
and type II errors (false alarms as percentage of periods in which no high-cost boom followed
22
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March 2009Figure 3: The central banker’s trade-oﬀ between missing crises and false alarms (and optimal thresholds) for
the Global M1 Gap. X-axis: θ.
within 6 quarters, B/(B+D)) are depicted on the Y-axis.27 The boxes between the two error
lines show the percentile minimizing the loss function for the indicator (globM1-detr). The
optimal percentile of the distribution of the M1 gap - which when exceeded triggers a warning
signal - declines in discontinuous steps with rising θ. Correspondingly, type I errors fall and
type II errors increase. Another way to use the information provided in Figure 3 is to choose
the threshold, which would produce acceptable type I and II errors for the decision maker. In
this particular example, it seems that a percentile of 85% looks like a reasonable choice. The
(time varying) thresholds associated with a 85% percentile did not allow issuing a warning
signal in 40% of quarters followed by a costly boom/bust cycle and provided false alarms in
20% of quarters not followed by a costly boom/bust cycle.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the most important information for the best 5 indicators for
diﬀerent θ, imposing the same optimized percentiles for all countries both for the 18 countries
and the sub group of 8 euro area countries, respectively.
27Please note there is no reason that type I and type II errors should add up to 1.
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March 2009Tables 1 and 2 can be used to answer the questions we are interested in, though the tables
in the Annex provide many more details with respect to the average lead time, the persistence
of the signals, the aNtS, and the number of booms predicted for diﬀerent θ.
Constructing early warning indicators in this simple way (i.e using a single indicator in a
signalling model) seems to provide useful information to predict costly asset price booms in
case of relatively balanced preferences of the policy maker. For example, Table 1 reveals that
taking the average over all countries with a balanced risk aversion between type I and type II
errors (θ =0 .5), using the global private credit gap, deﬁned as the PPP-GDP weighted average
of detrended private credit to GDP ratios, would reduce the preference weighted errors, i.e. the
loss, by 25 percentage points compared to a situation in which the policymaker would ignore
the indicator. The private credit gap would signal a costly asset price boom in 82% of quarters
which are actually followed by a costly boom within 6 quarters. The private credit gap would
issue a false alarm in 32% of cases in which no costly boom follows. The optimal percentile
to derive the threshold is 70% while it varies across countries between 40% and 85% (65-85%
for euro area countries), which results in a relatively low coeﬃcient of variation of 0.17 (0.10
for θ = 0.4, see Annex Table 4). The average lead time is 5.5 quarters. Most importantly,
95% of booms are signalled in at least one of the 6 preceding quarters (or one of the three
ﬁrst boom quarters), and the diﬀerence in the conditional and unconditional probability of a
boom following a signal is 16% (28% with the alternative detrending method (detr instead of
HP)).28
Tables 1 and 2 also reveal that the usefulness of the approach chosen here is not breath-
taking when policy makers have a clear preference for either type I or type II errors. Overall
losses are lowest for very low and very high θ, but the gain in computing an early warning
indicator in comparison to disregarding it, is only marginal for θ equal to 0.2, 0.3 and 0.8.
In the case of rather unbalanced preferences, the aversion to one or the other type of errors
is so high that it is hard to beat the benchmark, which is disregarding the indicator. This
is the case despite the fact that - as Annex Tables 3 and 6 show - aNtS are excellent by the
standards of the literature, i.e. much closer to zero than to one (e.g. as low as 0.12 for θ =0 .2).
28The crosses in the very left column of Figure 1 show as an example the exact periods in which GlobPC-HP
provides warning signals, i.e. the periods in which the indicator breaches the 70th percentile threshold.
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March 2009An additional argument suggesting that the mentioned indicators are useful can be derived
when the 10 low-cost booms in our evaluation period are used as control group. Annex Tables
9 and 10 show the performance of the 89 indicators in predicting low-cost instead of high-cost
booms, here for θ equal to 0.4. The best ﬁve indicators for the overall average as well as the
best three indicators for the euro area average are transformations of the real aggregate asset
price index which is used to deﬁne the boom episodes. It is not surprising that the aggregate
asset prices themselves are at some threshold able to predict a boom. The interesting point is
that with respect to low-cost booms, there is no other variable which contains more informa-
tion, in contrast to the high-cost boom exercises.29 This seems to suggest that there is genuine
information in e.g. private credit gaps to predict costly asset price boom episodes.
With respect to the question whether real or ﬁnancial variables contain more information
to predict costly asset price boom/bust cycles, Tables 1 and 2 suggest that ﬁnancial indicators
perform better. The results for all 18 countries (Table 1) show that it is only cumulated real
investment growth, for θ =0 .2 also the investment ratio gap and for θ equal to 0.6 and 0.8
also the real GDP gap which make it into the top ﬁve. Global private credit gaps and for
the three lower θ also the global M1 gap dominate. For the euro area countries (Table 2),
the dominance of ﬁnancial variables is even more evident. This is perhaps surprising, as the
ECB’s monetary policy strategy implicitly includes some element of leaning against the wind
of asset price cycles due to its second pillar, the monetary analysis. As there is evidence that
asset price boom/bust cycles are associated with money and credit cycles30 one could expect
the observable leading indicator properties of money and credit aggregates to be reduced over
time to the extent that leaning against the wind is eﬀectively pursued. In any case, this would
bias our results against ﬁnding a good forecast performance for ﬁnancial variables for euro
area countries.31
29An interesting observation, which is compatible with the previous argument, is that the higher θ the more
prominent the aggregate asset price index appears in the ranking of indicators, which is also visible in Tables
1 and 2. This shows that the more averse the policy maker is against missing a boom, the more diﬃcult it is
for any other indicator to provide relatively more useful warning signals than the asset price index itself.
30Adalid and Detken [2007] and Goodhart and Hofmann [2008].
31Borio and Lowe [2004] ﬁnd no evidence for leaning against the wind type of behavior in Australia, Germany,
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variables, the verdict is very clear for the results of the 18 countries. Global credit and global
money are the best indicators. For the euro area countries, detrended domestic long and short
term nominal interest rates, as well as domestic inverse M1-velocity gaps and cumulated M1
growth rates are often nearly as useful as the global private credit gaps. But overall, global
liquidity measures, especially but not only based on credit, seem to be the best indicators.
This result is certainly linked to the strong international correlation of asset price booms as
depicted in Figure 2.32 Nevertheless, even if one believes that what matters for asset price
booms is global liquidity, the dominance of global measures for domestic booms is not obvi-
ous, at least for the indicators based on broad monetary aggregates. One could expect that
global liquidity will aﬀect domestic asset prices once foreign capital is invested in a particular
country. In this case global liquidity would usually show up in domestic monetary aggregates
in case the foreign investment is settled through the banking system. This is not the case
for (domestic) credit based indicators, which is why Adalid and Detken [2007] suggest that
foreign capital ﬂows driving a wedge between money and credit aggregates might have been
one reason to explain their result that M3 based liquidity shocks are more relevant for asset
price booms than credit based measures. Indeed Annex Tables 3-8, where we show the full
set of results for all countries and the euro area weighted averages for three selected values of
θ, respectively, do not reveal any dominance of global M3 versus domestic M3 indicators. To
the contrary, the only somehow useful M3 based measures (same percentile for all countries
with θ =0 .4, Annex Table 4), are domestic M3 measures (M3-cum and M3-yoy).
There remains the question whether money or credit based liquidity measures perform bet-
ter. Borio and Lowe [2004] argue that credit is the better indicator for banking crises. Adalid
Japan and the US using Taylor rules as a benchmark for a neutral policy stance. Adalid and Detken [2007]
show that on average over 22 high-cost boom episodes across 18 OECD countries, Taylor rule gaps indicate
a loosening of monetary policy in pre-high-cost and during high-cost boom periods. As the samples of both
studies correspond with our evaluation window, the absence of leaning against the wind behavior might explain
the benign statistics of our ﬁnancial indicators.
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March 2009and Detken [2007] present evidence that M3 growth corrected for endogenous components
is a more robust determinant of post asset price boom recessions. Adrian and Shin [2008b]
argue that money could be the better indicator of growing ﬁnancial imbalances as it might be
a more comprehensive measure of banks balance sheets.33 The results in this paper suggest
that the diﬀerences between money (M1) and private credit are not very large, but that the
global credit gap is overall the best early warning indicator. The fact that M1 performs better
than M3 requires further investigation with respect to the underlying reason for the indicator
property of money. M1 focuses on the monetary policy stance while M3 would suggest the
role of money as a summary statistic of banks’ balance sheets.
Finally, we also tested whether joint indicators can further improve the usefulness of the
signalling approach. Joint indicators imply that a warning signal is issued only when both
indicators exceed their respective optimal thresholds.34 The matrix grid search is performed
and all percentile combinations of two joint indicators each in the range [0.05-0.95] with 0.05
steps were tested in order to ﬁnd the combination minimizing the loss function for six diﬀerent
values of θ. As this is computationally more expensive, we did not run all combinations of
our 89 indicators. We focused on the two best indicators, the global private credit gap and
the global M1 gap, and combined them with 16 indicators we were relatively more interested
in and/or which were among the best indicators in the single indicator analysis.35
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for the average over all countries and the weighted average
of euro area countries, respectively, requiring all countries to adopt the same percentiles per
indicator for θ =0 .4.
When comparing Table 3 with Annex Table 4 and Table 4 with Annex Table 7 a few
patterns emerge. The usefulness of joint indicators only slightly improves over the single best
indicator, by 1 percentage point for all countries and by 2 percentage points for the euro
33Adrian and Shin [2008a] instead argue that most likely neither money nor private credit are good indicators
as one should focus on investment banks’ balance sheets and disregard traditional Monetary and Financial
Institutions (MFI) balance sheets.
34See Borio and Lowe [2002].
35The indicators combined with globPC-detr and globM1-detr are QAAPR-HP, QAAPR-yoy, QRPR-HP,
QEPR-detr, LRN-detr, LRR-HP, SRN-detr, globSR-HP, shock-globalPC, shock-globalM3, REX-HP, GDPR-
HP, INV-yoy, HINV-yoy, CONS-cum, CPI-yoy; see legend in the Annex.
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March 2009area countries, which is not too impressive. The coeﬃcients of variation across the group of
countries increase strongly in the joint indicator exercises, possibly signalling that the optimal
thresholds from the joint indicator exercise are less robust and less easily applied to the euro
area as a whole. Improvements of the aNtS are more sizable (reductions up to 50%), which
is achieved by eliminating a large number of false alarms. Thus the overall best indicator (at
θ =0 .4) for the euro area weighted average (Table 4) would set a simultaneous 90 percentile
threshold for the global private credit gap and a 55 percentile threshold for detrended real
long-term bond yields (i.e. a detrended real bond yield only slightly lower than the median).
60% of periods in which a costly boom followed within six quarters has been correctly signalled.
False alarms are issued in only 9% of periods not followed by a costly boom. The aNtS is 0.14
and the average lead time 5.4 quarters (see Table 4, ﬁrst indicator row).
6 Predicting the Recent Boom/Bust Episode
Finally, we are interested to see whether the asset price booms which started in the mid 2000s
are predicted to be high-cost booms by our best indicators. In order to do so, we ﬁrst counted
the warning signals in the 11 quarters between the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 and the third quarter
of 2007 (the start of the ﬁnancial turmoil) for three of the best indicators. With respect to
the global private credit gap, the picture is mixed (see Table 5).
Table 5: Number of quarters where warning signals were issued in 2005Q1-2007Q3, i.e. 11-quarter-period
(θ =0 .3).
Indicator Optimal Number of
threshold signals
globPC-detr 90 (all) 0
90 (EA) 0
globPC-HP 70 (all) 7
85 (EA) 3
globM1-detr 90 (all) 0
95 (EA) 0
The outcome depends on the way the threshold is derived, in particular whether the per-
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March 2009centile to derive the threshold at each point in time is applied to past recursively derived
gaps (-detr) or at each point in time to an updated past gap distribution (-HP). The latter
method is associated with an optimal 70% threshold for all countries and the threshold has
been breached in 7 of the 11 quarters. For the euro area countries the optimal -HP threshold
is at the 85 percentile and 3 quarters provide a warning signal. Using globPC-detr as well as
the global M1 gap instead provided no warning signals at the optimal 90 or respectively 95
percentile thresholds, which is likely to constitute type I errors. This shows how the result can
depend on the method to derive the thresholds, as well as whether money or credit are used as
indicators (despite the fact that both performed well historically). From a global perspective,
the tightening of monetary policies during the second half of the 2000s has clearly been visible
in developments of M1 during our evaluation window, while credit growth had still been strong
enough to exceed the 70th percentile.
In Table 6 we report again the three global indicators shown in Table 5, but which are
here applied to the country speciﬁc booms identiﬁed in the late 2000s. We also checked the
three best indicators for predicting high-cost booms derived country by country and evaluated
whether they would have predicted a high-cost boom in the 6 quarters preceding the boom
and the ﬁrst three boom quarters. The time window for which the number of warning signals
is reported is mentioned for each country in Table 6. In case no boom has been identiﬁed for
a particular country in the second half of this decade, we evaluate the signals for the last 9
quarters of our sample. In the lower part of Table 6, the country speciﬁc indicators as well as
the optimal thresholds are shown beside the number of quarters in which warning signals are
issued.
Apart from Belgium and New Zealand, the global private credit gap (-HP) issued at least
one warning signal for all countries, while the global M1 gap did not. The results for the
country speciﬁc indicators certainly provide a very mixed picture. These results are similar to
Borio and Drehmann [2008] who ﬁnd that the performance of their best indicator, i.e. a joint
domestic private credit and property price gap, in the recent episode depends on the deﬁnition
of a banking crisis. According to a restrictive deﬁnition of a crisis the indicator picks two out
33
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March 2009of three countries in crisis. With a less restrictive deﬁnition, it issues a warning signal in 9
out of 14 countries with banking crises.
7 Conclusions
We analyze the performance of a signalling approach to predict high cost aggregate asset price
booms for 18 OECD countries since the 1970s. We deviate from the standard early warning
indicator literature by simulating a ‘real time’ exercise and by focusing on the usefulness of
indicators from a policy maker’s perspective.
The results show that some indicators perform very well on average over our two country
groups (all 18 and 8 euro area countries, respectively) with regard to standard evaluation
criteria like the adjusted noise to signal ratio.36 The usefulness of the indicators for a policy
maker though crucially depends on her relative preferences with respect to missed crises and
false alarms. In case of relatively balanced preferences, the best indicator reduces the prefer-
ence weighted sum of type I and type II errors by as much as 25 percentage points compared
to a situation in which the indicator is ignored.
In our opinion central bankers on average tend to have a stronger preference for missing
crises than to act on noisy signals for various reasons. The recent ﬁnancial crisis may have
changed this to some degree. Preferences becoming more balanced might explain the growing
interest in early warning systems with respect to ﬁnancial imbalances.
The best indicator for a policy maker who is only slightly more averse against false alarms
than missed crises, is the global private credit gap. In terms of the absolute performance using
the optimal 70% percentile across countries predicted on average 95% of high-cost booms by
issuing a signal in at least one of the six preceding quarters. The share of correct signals as
a percentage of periods in which a high-cost boom actually developed within the following
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March 2009six quarters is 82%. The share of false alarms as a percentage of periods in which no high-
cost boom followed is 32% and the average lead time for the ﬁrst warning signal is 5.5 quarters.
Considering joint indicators is one way of signiﬁcantly reducing the noisiness of signals (by
close to 50%), without though noticeably improving the overall gain with respect to preference
weighted errors. Furthermore, the optimal threshold percentiles of joint indicators reveal a
much stronger cross-country variation than single indicators, which raises issues for extracting
optimal percentiles for the euro area by analyzing historical data for individual countries.
With respect to the other three questions mentioned upfront, the results of this paper
would suggest that ﬁnancial variables contain more information for predicting costly asset
price booms than the real indicators we tested, that global ﬁnancial indicators perform better
than domestic ones and that global credit outperforms global money, though often by a very
small margin.
The good performance of global ﬁnancial indicators certainly reﬂects the large interna-
tional simultaneity of the identiﬁed asset price cycles. This underlines the legitimacy of at
least reﬂecting on stability oriented macro and macro-prudential policies from an international
perspective.
Nevertheless, as the exercise of predicting the most recent boom wave shows, historically
nearly equally well performing indicators can provide diﬀerent messages. Signals obtained
by any of the suggested indicators should thus be interpreted very carefully and should only
be considered one of several inputs to the information set of decision makers. In particular,
reliance on any single or joint indictor is certainly not advisable at this stage. One way to
proceed might be to consider weighted composite indicators as in Kaminsky et al. [1998] and
Edison [2003].
Nevertheless the evidence presented in this paper - in our view - shows that the often
claimed unavailability of timely warning indicators is unlikely to be a major hindrance for
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March 2009‘leaning against the wind’ type of policies, if the latter would be deemed desirable by policy
makers.
In terms of future research, results suggested here should be cross-checked and qualiﬁed by
discrete choice models in particular to better explore the degree of non-linearity and the co-
dependence between variables to derive an operational early warning indicator system for
costly asset price boom/bust cycles. Furthermore, other balance sheet items of (other) ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries should be analyzed with respect to their information content.
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In the tables in the main text as well as this Annex we use the following notation:
Transformations:
detr and HP=deviations from slowly adjusting, recursive Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter trend with a
λ of 100000 instead of the usual 1600 for quarterly data. The diﬀerence between detr and HP
only concerns the derivation of the threshold as explained in the main text;
yoy=year on year growth rates;




CONS=private ﬁnal consumption expenditure;
INV=gross total ﬁxed capital formation;
HINV=private residential ﬁxed capital formation;
QAAPR=real aggregate asset price index;
QEPR=real equity price index;
QRPR= real residential property price index;
LRN=long-term bond yield, nominal;
LRR=long-term bond yield, real;
SRN=short-term interest rate, nominal;
SRR=short-term interest rate, real;
spread=long-term bond yield minus short-term interest rate;
REX=real eﬀective exchange rate index; M1 and M3=respective monetary aggregates; for
AU, CA, UK, JP, NO, NZ, SE and the US M3 refers to a broad aggregate M2 or M3;
PCR=real private credit;
DCR=real domestic credit;
PCNtoGDP and DCNtoGDP=respective ratios of nominal variables.
shock[]=six lagged quarters moving average of standard macro VAR including asset prices
and money and alternatively credit ordered last (see Adalid and Detken [2007]), estimated
recursively.
glob or Global in the notation of variables refers to PPP-GDP weighted averages of the series
from all 18 countries. Global credit and monetary aggregates are all nominal ratios to GDP.
All data except asset prices are seasonally adjusted. For QRPR we also use a seasonally
adjusted series (-sa).
The main data source is OECD Economic Outlook and Main Economic Indicators. Domestic
and private credit are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, lines 32 and 32D,
respectively. The latter two series have been corrected for structural breaks as described in
Adalid and Detken [2007]. Asset price indices have been kindly provided by the BIS. Narrow
monetary aggregates are from the BIS and ECB sources.
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
called
CONS-cum 0.18 0.85 0.77 0.22 0.28 0.38 0.24 5.6 3.5
LRN-detr 0.17 0.86 0.80 0.24 0.30 0.42 0.28 5.8 3.3
QEPR-detr 0.17 0.96 0.88 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.24 5.9 2.9
globPC-HP 0.17 0.89 0.78 0.24 0.30 0.38 0.24 5.7 3.3
CONS-yoy 0.16 0.93 0.78 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.19 5.5 3.0
INV-cum 0.16 0.95 0.69 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.25 4.9 3.5
M1-cum 0.15 0.79 0.70 0.21 0.30 0.37 0.23 5.7 3.3
GDPR-detr 0.15 0.89 0.73 0.24 0.33 0.37 0.23 5.2 3.1
globPC-detr 0.15 0.75 0.73 0.24 0.33 0.45 0.30 6.0 3.0
globM1-detr 0.15 0.66 0.59 0.15 0.25 0.45 0.31 5.6 3.9
PCR-yoy 0.14 0.73 0.62 0.17 0.28 0.45 0.31 5.4 3.6
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.14 0.88 0.81 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.22 5.9 2.7
QAAPR-HP 0.14 0.87 0.76 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.21 5.3 2.9
PCR-cum 0.14 0.74 0.68 0.21 0.31 0.38 0.24 5.6 3.2
QAAPR-yoy 0.14 1.00 0.81 0.30 0.37 0.32 0.18 5.4 2.7
GDPR-HP 0.14 0.98 0.87 0.34 0.39 0.29 0.15 5.8 2.5
INVtoGDP-HP 0.14 0.86 0.73 0.25 0.35 0.32 0.18 5.4 2.9
INV-yoy 0.14 0.90 0.66 0.21 0.31 0.34 0.20 5.1 3.2
QAAPR-cum 0.14 0.93 0.77 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.21 5.0 2.7
INVtoGDP-detr 0.14 0.72 0.65 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.23 5.8 3.2
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.14 0.83 0.73 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.18 5.4 2.8
M1-yoy 0.14 0.75 0.61 0.18 0.30 0.39 0.25 5.4 3.4
QAAPR-detr 0.13 1.00 0.86 0.35 0.41 0.32 0.18 5.5 2.5
HINV-yoy 0.13 0.84 0.57 0.16 0.28 0.41 0.27 4.6 3.6
M3-cum 0.13 0.72 0.61 0.19 0.31 0.37 0.24 5.3 3.2
SRN-detr 0.13 0.91 0.73 0.27 0.37 0.35 0.21 5.5 2.7
HINV-cum 0.13 0.67 0.48 0.10 0.22 0.40 0.26 4.8 4.6
QRPR-sa-HP 0.13 0.80 0.70 0.25 0.36 0.32 0.17 5.4 2.8
QRPR-HP 0.13 0.79 0.69 0.25 0.36 0.32 0.18 5.3 2.7
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.12 0.88 0.71 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.20 5.3 2.7
M3-yoy 0.12 0.74 0.53 0.15 0.28 0.41 0.28 4.6 3.6
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.12 0.53 0.43 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.17 5.0 4.9
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.12 0.67 0.50 0.14 0.27 0.41 0.26 4.5 3.6
DCR-yoy 0.11 0.78 0.63 0.23 0.37 0.35 0.21 5.2 2.7
QEPR-HP 0.11 0.86 0.61 0.23 0.37 0.32 0.18 5.3 2.7
DCR-cum 0.11 0.65 0.59 0.22 0.36 0.23 0.09 5.6 2.7
globM1-HP 0.11 0.65 0.52 0.17 0.32 0.34 0.20 5.5 3.1
QEPR-cum 0.11 0.88 0.66 0.26 0.40 0.33 0.19 5.1 2.5
shock-PC 0.11 0.74 0.53 0.18 0.33 0.37 0.22 5.4 3.0
QEPR-yoy 0.11 0.94 0.71 0.30 0.42 0.34 0.20 5.4 2.4
M1toGDP-detr 0.10 0.77 0.68 0.28 0.41 0.31 0.17 5.6 2.4
PCNtoGDP-HP 0.10 0.72 0.61 0.23 0.38 0.33 0.19 5.3 2.6
globM3-detr 0.10 0.60 0.57 0.21 0.38 0.23 0.09 5.9 2.7
QRPN-satoGDP-HP 0.10 0.67 0.62 0.25 0.41 0.31 0.16 5.4 2.5
QRPR-sa-cum 0.09 0.78 0.72 0.32 0.45 0.25 0.11 5.3 2.2
QRPR-sa-yoy 0.09 0.85 0.70 0.31 0.44 0.27 0.13 5.0 2.3
QRPNtoGDP-HP 0.09 0.64 0.58 0.23 0.39 0.34 0.19 5.3 2.5
PCNtoGDP-detr 0.09 0.71 0.65 0.28 0.43 0.29 0.14 5.8 2.3
QRPR-yoy 0.09 0.83 0.70 0.31 0.45 0.27 0.13 5.1 2.2
shock-M1 0.09 0.57 0.39 0.11 0.27 0.34 0.21 5.1 3.6
SRN-lev 0.09 0.86 0.80 0.39 0.48 0.30 0.16 5.7 2.1
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.09 0.78 0.60 0.26 0.43 0.28 0.14 5.4 2.3
globSR-HP 0.08 0.94 0.89 0.45 0.51 0.24 0.10 5.9 2.0
QRPR-cum 0.08 0.77 0.69 0.32 0.46 0.23 0.09 5.6 2.2
M1toGDP-HP 0.08 0.72 0.57 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.17 5.8 2.3
SRR-detr 0.08 0.91 0.76 0.37 0.49 0.26 0.11 5.5 2.0
DCNtoGDP-detr 0.08 0.76 0.66 0.31 0.47 0.28 0.14 5.7 2.1
LRR-HP 0.07 0.77 0.63 0.30 0.48 0.30 0.16 5.7 2.1
REX-HP 0.07 0.62 0.44 0.17 0.40 0.29 0.15 5.1 2.5
shock-GlobalPC 0.07 0.71 0.46 0.19 0.42 0.24 0.10 5.3 2.4
LRR-detr 0.07 0.85 0.69 0.34 0.50 0.23 0.09 5.5 2.0
LRN-HP 0.07 0.68 0.60 0.28 0.48 0.25 0.11 5.9 2.1
shock-GlobalM1 0.07 0.56 0.38 0.14 0.37 0.26 0.12 5.2 2.7
SRR-lev 0.07 0.34 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.41 0.24 5.6 3.4
LRN-lev 0.06 0.85 0.80 0.43 0.53 0.24 0.10 5.8 1.9
spread-lev 0.06 0.56 0.49 0.22 0.45 0.32 0.17 5.4 2.2
QRPR-sa-detr 0.06 0.76 0.71 0.37 0.52 0.25 0.11 5.3 1.9
QRPR-detr 0.06 0.76 0.71 0.37 0.53 0.25 0.11 5.3 1.9
shock-M3 0.06 0.56 0.43 0.19 0.44 0.27 0.12 5.5 2.2
globM3-HP 0.05 0.79 0.66 0.35 0.53 0.24 0.10 5.4 1.9
shock-GlobalM3 0.05 0.38 0.28 0.10 0.37 0.34 0.18 5.4 2.7
REX-cum 0.05 0.54 0.33 0.14 0.42 0.23 0.09 4.8 2.4
LRR-lev 0.05 0.32 0.30 0.12 0.40 0.27 0.12 5.7 2.5
DCNtoGDP-HP 0.05 0.55 0.40 0.19 0.47 0.20 0.05 5.3 2.1
QRPN-satoGDP-detr 0.04 0.63 0.57 0.31 0.55 0.22 0.08 4.8 1.8
globSR-detr 0.04 0.43 0.37 0.18 0.49 0.21 0.07 5.6 2.0
SRN-HP 0.04 0.58 0.41 0.21 0.51 0.18 0.05 5.2 2.0
M3toGDP-detr 0.04 0.59 0.51 0.27 0.54 0.22 0.07 4.9 1.9
REX-detr 0.04 0.66 0.51 0.28 0.55 0.26 0.12 5.1 1.8
QRPNtoGDP-detr 0.04 0.63 0.59 0.33 0.57 0.21 0.06 5.0 1.8
REX-yoy 0.03 0.54 0.38 0.20 0.52 0.21 0.07 5.5 1.9
SRR-HP 0.03 0.50 0.34 0.17 0.51 0.18 0.03 5.5 2.0
M3toGDP-HP 0.03 0.34 0.28 0.14 0.49 0.16 0.02 5.9 2.0
-spread-lev 0.02 0.44 0.31 0.18 0.57 0.13 0.00 5.0 1.8
CONStoGDP-detr 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.08 0.50 0.15 0.01 5.3 2.0
globSR-lev 0.02 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.55 0.10 -0.04 5.7 1.8
CPI-yoy 0.01 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.55 0.26 0.10 5.5 1.8
CPI-cum 0.01 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.53 0.19 0.03 4.9 1.9
CONStoGDP-HP 0.01 0.35 0.16 0.10 0.60 0.17 0.02 4.1 1.7
Table 1: θ =0 .4, average results over all countries, High-Cost Booms.
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
called
globPC-detr 0.18 0.69 0.67 0.15 0.22 0.55 0.39 5.8 4.6
globPC-HP 0.18 0.92 0.84 0.26 0.31 0.39 0.23 5.7 3.2
LRN-detr 0.18 0.83 0.73 0.19 0.26 0.49 0.33 5.3 3.8
M1toGDP-detr 0.17 0.85 0.78 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.21 5.7 3.3
QEPR-detr 0.17 0.84 0.76 0.22 0.29 0.39 0.23 5.9 3.4
SRN-detr 0.16 0.70 0.58 0.12 0.21 0.37 0.27 4.2 4.8
M1-cum 0.16 0.92 0.75 0.24 0.32 0.41 0.25 5.6 3.1
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.15 0.75 0.71 0.22 0.31 0.38 0.22 5.8 3.2
INVtoGDP-HP 0.14 1.00 0.84 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.18 5.4 2.6
INV-cum 0.14 0.99 0.73 0.26 0.35 0.38 0.22 5.0 2.9
INV-yoy 0.14 1.00 0.75 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.19 5.0 2.8
globM1-detr 0.14 0.74 0.61 0.17 0.29 0.38 0.23 4.8 3.5
M1-yoy 0.13 0.85 0.72 0.26 0.36 0.37 0.21 5.6 2.8
QAAPR-yoy 0.13 1.00 0.88 0.36 0.41 0.32 0.16 5.9 2.4
QAAPR-cum 0.13 1.00 0.87 0.36 0.41 0.31 0.15 5.7 2.4
QEPR-cum 0.13 0.83 0.66 0.23 0.34 0.38 0.22 5.5 2.9
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.13 1.00 0.68 0.24 0.36 0.34 0.19 5.3 2.8
QEPR-yoy 0.13 0.95 0.67 0.24 0.36 0.36 0.20 5.0 2.8
QAAPR-HP 0.12 0.99 0.81 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.14 5.8 2.4
LRR-HP 0.12 0.85 0.76 0.31 0.40 0.35 0.19 5.4 2.5
CONS-yoy 0.12 0.95 0.68 0.25 0.37 0.31 0.16 4.6 2.7
globSR-HP 0.11 1.00 0.93 0.43 0.46 0.31 0.15 5.9 2.2
HINV-yoy 0.11 0.59 0.38 0.06 0.17 0.44 0.30 4.0 5.9
PCR-cum 0.11 0.63 0.48 0.14 0.28 0.35 0.21 3.9 3.5
SRN-lev 0.11 0.87 0.79 0.35 0.44 0.36 0.21 6.0 2.3
LRN-HP 0.11 0.49 0.45 0.12 0.26 0.24 0.14 4.0 3.8
GDPR-HP 0.10 1.00 0.90 0.43 0.48 0.28 0.12 5.8 2.1
CONS-cum 0.10 0.68 0.51 0.17 0.33 0.29 0.15 4.1 3.0
PCR-yoy 0.10 0.58 0.45 0.13 0.29 0.40 0.26 3.4 3.4
shock-GlobalPC 0.10 0.93 0.63 0.26 0.40 0.31 0.16 5.3 2.5
M1toGDP-HP 0.10 0.85 0.76 0.34 0.45 0.35 0.20 5.8 2.2
QEPR-HP 0.10 0.79 0.59 0.23 0.40 0.32 0.16 5.4 2.5
shock-M1 0.09 0.55 0.40 0.11 0.27 0.31 0.16 3.4 3.7
HINV-cum 0.09 0.58 0.32 0.06 0.18 0.36 0.22 3.1 5.7
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.09 0.79 0.74 0.34 0.46 0.27 0.11 4.6 2.2
M3-cum 0.09 0.73 0.69 0.32 0.46 0.20 0.09 4.4 2.2
globM3-detr 0.09 0.56 0.50 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.05 4.3 2.6
GDPR-detr 0.08 0.59 0.44 0.16 0.36 0.34 0.18 3.5 2.8
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.08 0.79 0.67 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.13 5.9 2.1
REX-HP 0.08 0.55 0.35 0.10 0.29 0.24 0.14 3.1 3.4
QAAPR-detr 0.08 1.00 0.86 0.44 0.52 0.32 0.17 5.5 1.9
SRN-HP 0.08 0.46 0.37 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.03 2.8 3.1
SRR-detr 0.08 0.95 0.65 0.31 0.47 0.30 0.14 5.6 2.1
globSR-detr 0.07 0.59 0.43 0.17 0.39 0.26 0.10 2.7 2.6
shock-PC 0.07 0.63 0.50 0.22 0.43 0.25 0.13 3.3 2.3
globM1-HP 0.07 0.49 0.39 0.15 0.37 0.22 0.06 3.0 2.7
INVtoGDP-detr 0.07 0.43 0.39 0.15 0.38 0.29 0.13 4.2 2.6
PCNtoGDP-detr 0.06 0.57 0.52 0.24 0.47 0.26 0.10 5.0 2.1
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.06 0.46 0.29 0.09 0.32 0.34 0.21 2.6 3.1
REX-cum 0.06 0.51 0.30 0.10 0.33 0.23 0.08 2.9 3.0
DCR-yoy 0.06 0.94 0.79 0.43 0.54 0.26 0.11 5.7 1.8
QRPR-sa-HP 0.06 0.68 0.55 0.27 0.49 0.18 0.02 3.6 2.0
PCNtoGDP-HP 0.06 0.79 0.73 0.39 0.53 0.29 0.13 4.8 1.9
SRR-lev 0.06 0.32 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.45 0.33 3.3 4.5
SRR-HP 0.06 0.62 0.42 0.19 0.44 0.20 0.05 3.6 2.3
globM3-HP 0.05 0.70 0.58 0.30 0.51 0.34 0.18 4.9 2.0
QRPR-HP 0.05 0.69 0.54 0.27 0.50 0.18 0.02 3.6 2.0
DCNtoGDP-detr 0.05 0.65 0.60 0.31 0.52 0.19 0.03 4.8 1.9
DCR-cum 0.05 0.51 0.46 0.22 0.48 0.12 -0.04 2.9 2.1
LRN-lev 0.05 0.72 0.71 0.39 0.55 0.29 0.14 6.0 1.8
M3-yoy 0.05 0.59 0.43 0.20 0.47 0.19 0.08 3.3 2.1
spread-lev 0.05 0.62 0.43 0.21 0.48 0.30 0.16 4.1 2.1
shock-GlobalM3 0.05 0.44 0.31 0.13 0.41 0.23 0.11 3.1 2.4
REX-yoy 0.04 0.47 0.41 0.21 0.50 0.15 0.00 3.5 2.0
globSR-lev 0.04 0.49 0.42 0.21 0.51 0.17 0.01 3.0 2.0
LRR-detr 0.04 0.78 0.57 0.32 0.56 0.23 0.07 3.9 1.8
QRPN-satoGDP-HP 0.04 0.67 0.57 0.32 0.56 0.17 0.01 3.8 1.8
CONStoGDP-detr 0.04 0.34 0.23 0.10 0.41 0.27 0.12 3.0 2.4
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.04 0.28 0.14 0.03 0.24 0.21 0.05 1.7 4.2
QRPNtoGDP-HP 0.04 0.66 0.57 0.32 0.56 0.16 0.00 3.8 1.8
shock-GlobalM1 0.03 0.46 0.27 0.12 0.46 0.17 0.02 3.5 2.2
LRR-lev 0.03 0.37 0.31 0.15 0.49 0.19 0.08 3.3 2.0
REX-detr 0.03 0.70 0.41 0.22 0.54 0.32 0.17 4.9 1.9
CONStoGDP-HP 0.03 0.46 0.15 0.05 0.32 0.31 0.16 2.7 3.1
shock-M3 0.03 0.42 0.20 0.08 0.42 0.25 0.14 2.7 2.4
QRPR-sa-yoy 0.03 0.70 0.57 0.33 0.59 0.16 0.01 3.8 1.7
QRPR-yoy 0.03 0.66 0.55 0.33 0.59 0.16 0.01 3.9 1.7
CPI-yoy 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.43 0.20 0.14 1.3 2.3
CPI-cum 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.44 0.16 0.10 1.0 2.2
QRPR-sa-cum 0.01 0.48 0.41 0.26 0.64 0.13 -0.03 2.6 1.6
M3toGDP-HP 0.00 0.56 0.41 0.27 0.65 0.14 -0.02 3.3 1.5
QRPR-cum 0.00 0.48 0.41 0.27 0.67 0.12 -0.03 2.7 1.5
DCNtoGDP-HP -0.01 0.65 0.41 0.28 0.69 0.17 0.02 3.8 1.4
-spread-lev -0.01 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.94 0.02 -0.03 0.4 1.1
QRPR-sa-detr -0.02 0.48 0.43 0.31 0.73 0.12 -0.04 2.7 1.4
QRPN-satoGDP-detr -0.02 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.78 0.05 -0.10 1.5 1.3
QRPR-detr -0.02 0.48 0.44 0.33 0.73 0.12 -0.04 2.8 1.4
QRPNtoGDP-detr -0.02 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.80 0.05 -0.10 1.5 1.2
M3toGDP-detr -0.02 0.53 0.38 0.29 0.77 0.13 -0.03 3.1 1.3
Table 2: θ =0 .4, weighted-average results over EA countries, High-Cost Booms.
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
Percen. Variation called
globM1-detr 0.03 95 0.03 0.51 0.38 0.06 0.17 0.52 0.38 5.3 6.0
shock-GlobalM1 0.01 95 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.57 0.43 3.3 8.5
globM1-HP 0.01 95 0.04 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.57 0.43 3.3 6.9
M1-cum 0.01 95 0.10 0.33 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.36 0.22 4.7 5.2
INVtoGDP-detr 0.00 95 0.11 0.40 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.40 0.26 3.4 4.3
INV-cum 0.00 95 0.12 0.53 0.18 0.04 0.24 0.40 0.25 3.6 4.2
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.00 95 0.06 0.32 0.16 0.04 0.24 0.30 0.15 3.0 4.2
shock-M1 0.00 95 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.23 0.35 0.21 3.9 4.4
HINV-yoy 0.00 90 0.08 0.52 0.16 0.04 0.25 0.43 0.29 3.0 4.1
shock-GlobalM3 0.00 90 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
SRR-lev 0.00 95 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19
globPC-detr 0.00 95 0.03 0.59 0.44 0.11 0.25 0.48 0.34 5.3 4.0
CONS-yoy 0.00 95 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.34 0.50 0.33 3.2 2.9
HINV-cum 0.00 90 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.03 0.27 0.39 0.25 3.7 3.8
M3-cum 0.00 85 0.10 0.41 0.25 0.06 0.26 0.35 0.20 4.7 3.9
M3-yoy 0.00 95 0.11 0.27 0.08 0.02 0.28 0.50 0.36 3.6 3.5
globPC-HP 0.00 95 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.31 0.42 0.27 4.2 3.3
M1-yoy 0.00 95 0.10 0.25 0.14 0.04 0.28 0.35 0.21 4.4 3.6
CONS-cum 0.00 95 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.20 0.06 5.0 1.4
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.00 95 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.23 2.8 2.5
PCR-yoy -0.01 95 0.15 0.25 0.09 0.03 0.34 0.42 0.28 3.7 3.0
INVtoGDP-HP -0.01 95 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.34 0.18 0.04 3.4 2.9
LRR-lev -0.01 95 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.13
INV-yoy -0.01 95 0.11 0.35 0.11 0.04 0.33 0.33 0.18 3.3 3.0
shock-GlobalPC -0.01 95 0.10 0.17 0.05 0.02 0.45 0.22 0.08 4.9 2.2
CPI-yoy -0.01 95 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.17
CPI-cum -0.01 95 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.15
QRPNtoGDP-HP -0.01 95 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.54 0.38 0.24 3.3 1.9
PCR-cum -0.01 95 0.12 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.42 0.29 0.14 3.7 2.4
QRPR-yoy -0.01 95 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.62 0.19 0.06 3.5 1.6
DCR-cum -0.01 95 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.45 0.19 0.04 4.3 2.2
QRPR-HP -0.01 95 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.44 0.31 0.18 2.5 2.3
QRPN-satoGDP-HP -0.01 95 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.57 0.28 0.14 3.2 1.8
SRR-HP -0.01 95 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 1.15 0.08 -0.08 3.8 0.9
DCR-yoy -0.01 95 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.51 0.13 -0.02 4.8 2.0
LRR-HP -0.01 95 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.77 0.16 0.00 4.5 1.3
QRPR-sa-yoy -0.01 95 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.65 0.17 0.02 3.5 1.5
QAAPR-cum -0.01 95 0.07 0.38 0.14 0.05 0.36 0.39 0.24 2.7 2.8
QRPR-sa-HP -0.01 95 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.61 0.31 0.18 3.2 1.7
shock-M3 -0.01 95 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.11 0.20 0.04 6.0 0.9
shock-PC -0.01 95 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.68 0.11 -0.03 4.0 1.5
QAAPR-yoy -0.01 95 0.08 0.32 0.13 0.05 0.39 0.28 0.13 2.8 2.6
GDPR-detr -0.01 95 0.09 0.65 0.37 0.11 0.30 0.35 0.21 4.3 3.4
QRPR-sa-cum -0.01 95 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.71 0.25 0.10 2.6 1.4
globSR-HP -0.02 90 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 1.78 0.13 -0.02 3.8 0.6
QEPR-detr -0.02 95 0.10 0.71 0.47 0.14 0.29 0.35 0.21 4.9 3.4
QRPR-cum -0.02 95 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.03 1.36 0.22 0.07 2.5 0.7
QEPR-HP -0.02 95 0.04 0.42 0.18 0.07 0.39 0.34 0.19 4.0 2.6
QEPR-cum -0.02 95 0.03 0.45 0.20 0.08 0.37 0.32 0.18 4.0 2.7
QAAPR-HP -0.02 95 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.05 0.53 0.33 0.18 2.2 1.9
QEPNtoGDP-detr -0.02 95 0.07 0.61 0.39 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.19 4.7 3.2
QAAPNtoGDP-HP -0.02 95 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.68 0.25 0.09 2.9 1.5
LRN-detr -0.02 95 0.08 0.44 0.28 0.10 0.35 0.38 0.24 4.9 2.9
globM3-HP -0.02 95 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.03 1.82 0.10 -0.04 2.9 0.5
QEPNtoGDP-HP -0.02 95 0.03 0.31 0.11 0.06 0.53 0.31 0.16 3.0 1.9
REX-cum -0.02 95 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.69 0.25 0.11 3.7 1.4
QEPR-yoy -0.02 95 0.03 0.41 0.16 0.07 0.44 0.30 0.16 3.6 2.3
globSR-detr -0.02 95 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.78 0.13 -0.02 4.8 0.6
SRN-HP -0.03 95 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.04 1.81 0.06 -0.09 5.2 0.6
REX-yoy -0.03 95 0.02 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.79 0.16 0.02 3.7 1.3
M3toGDP-HP -0.03 95 0.02 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.51 0.13 -0.01 4.2 2.0
SRN-detr -0.03 95 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.66 0.24 0.10 3.6 1.5
REX-HP -0.03 95 0.04 0.22 0.07 0.05 0.76 0.25 0.12 3.0 1.3
spread-lev -0.03 95 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.05 2.00 0.13 -0.02 1.8 0.5
GDPR-HP -0.03 95 0.08 0.32 0.12 0.07 0.59 0.12 -0.01 4.4 1.7
LRN-HP -0.03 95 0.04 0.29 0.14 0.08 0.56 0.20 0.06 5.0 1.8
CONStoGDP-detr -0.03 95 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.06 1.09 0.12 -0.02 4.8 0.9
CONStoGDP-HP -0.03 95 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.05 1.47 0.10 -0.04 3.0 0.7
PCNtoGDP-HP -0.03 95 0.08 0.28 0.15 0.08 0.54 0.29 0.16 4.2 1.9
globM3-detr -0.04 95 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.07 0.76 0.16 0.02 3.3 1.3
M1toGDP-HP -0.04 95 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.07 0.68 0.19 0.05 4.5 1.5
-spread-lev -0.04 95 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.05 12.29 0.02 -0.12 4.0 0.1
QAAPR-detr -0.04 95 0.06 0.47 0.19 0.10 0.50 0.27 0.13 2.3 2.0
globSR-lev -0.04 95 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.05 7.64 0.04 -0.10 2.8 0.1
QAAPNtoGDP-detr -0.04 95 0.13 0.37 0.17 0.09 0.56 0.28 0.14 2.9 1.8
LRR-detr -0.04 95 0.03 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.74 0.16 0.01 3.8 1.4
REX-detr -0.05 95 0.11 0.26 0.11 0.09 0.76 0.18 0.03 4.2 1.3
SRR-detr -0.05 95 0.05 0.30 0.10 0.08 0.83 0.14 0.00 3.6 1.2
QRPN-satoGDP-detr -0.05 95 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.07 1.95 0.12 -0.03 1.6 0.5
QRPNtoGDP-detr -0.05 95 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.07 1.98 0.12 -0.03 1.6 0.5
DCNtoGDP-HP -0.05 95 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.08 1.29 0.13 -0.01 4.3 0.8
QRPR-sa-detr -0.05 95 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.08 1.32 0.18 0.04 1.8 0.8
QRPR-detr -0.06 95 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.08 1.60 0.17 0.03 1.9 0.6
PCNtoGDP-detr -0.06 95 0.11 0.38 0.21 0.13 0.62 0.22 0.08 4.6 1.6
M1toGDP-detr -0.07 95 0.05 0.48 0.28 0.16 0.56 0.23 0.09 5.0 1.8
DCNtoGDP-detr -0.08 95 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.14 0.94 0.18 0.04 4.5 1.1
M3toGDP-detr -0.08 95 0.10 0.34 0.18 0.15 0.83 0.17 0.03 4.5 1.2
SRN-lev -0.09 95 0.03 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.83 0.23 0.10 5.0 1.2
LRN-lev -0.13 95 0.10 0.40 0.26 0.22 0.85 0.21 0.07 4.7 1.2
Table 3: θ =0 .2, average results over all countries (same percentile), High-Cost Booms.
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
Percen. Variation called
globPC-HP 0.13 70 0.10 0.95 0.82 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.16 5.5 2.5
globPC-detr 0.13 90 0.39 0.59 0.55 0.15 0.28 0.42 0.28 5.8 3.6
globM1-detr 0.12 90 0.08 0.61 0.48 0.12 0.25 0.41 0.27 5.2 3.9
QEPR-detr 0.11 80 0.25 0.88 0.73 0.31 0.42 0.28 0.14 5.3 2.4
INV-cum 0.11 65 0.21 0.97 0.67 0.27 0.40 0.29 0.15 4.9 2.5
CONS-cum 0.11 55 0.33 0.87 0.64 0.25 0.39 0.30 0.16 4.8 2.6
INV-yoy 0.11 70 0.25 1.00 0.59 0.22 0.37 0.31 0.17 4.7 2.7
QAAPR-yoy 0.10 70 0.24 0.98 0.62 0.25 0.41 0.30 0.16 4.5 2.5
GDPR-HP 0.10 80 0.26 0.92 0.60 0.24 0.40 0.28 0.14 5.1 2.5
CONS-yoy 0.10 50 0.30 0.97 0.73 0.32 0.45 0.26 0.12 5.1 2.2
QAAPR-HP 0.09 85 0.18 0.78 0.47 0.16 0.34 0.35 0.21 3.8 2.9
LRN-detr 0.09 85 0.24 0.65 0.51 0.19 0.37 0.34 0.20 5.3 2.7
QAAPR-cum 0.09 80 0.27 0.86 0.49 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.21 3.8 2.8
HINV-yoy 0.09 75 0.18 0.81 0.45 0.15 0.34 0.32 0.18 4.0 3.0
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.09 90 0.31 0.71 0.49 0.18 0.37 0.31 0.17 5.1 2.7
INVtoGDP-HP 0.08 65 0.23 0.98 0.70 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.12 5.1 2.1
GDPR-detr 0.08 85 0.25 0.80 0.59 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.13 4.9 2.3
HINV-cum 0.08 70 0.16 0.77 0.47 0.18 0.39 0.30 0.16 4.2 2.6
PCR-yoy 0.08 75 0.33 0.56 0.39 0.13 0.33 0.32 0.18 4.8 3.0
QRPR-sa-HP 0.08 75 0.19 0.82 0.60 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.12 4.7 2.2
QAAPR-detr 0.07 70 0.33 0.95 0.77 0.39 0.51 0.24 0.10 5.0 2.0
INVtoGDP-detr 0.07 85 0.29 0.54 0.41 0.15 0.37 0.26 0.12 5.6 2.7
M1-yoy 0.07 75 0.19 0.81 0.57 0.25 0.45 0.27 0.13 4.6 2.2
M1-cum 0.07 75 0.24 0.78 0.58 0.27 0.46 0.26 0.12 4.6 2.2
M3-cum 0.07 80 0.32 0.48 0.32 0.09 0.30 0.34 0.20 4.3 3.3
PCR-cum 0.07 70 0.32 0.57 0.46 0.19 0.42 0.26 0.12 5.2 2.4
M3-yoy 0.07 80 0.28 0.52 0.31 0.09 0.30 0.35 0.21 4.1 3.3
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.07 80 0.17 0.64 0.34 0.11 0.33 0.31 0.17 4.1 3.0
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.07 90 0.12 0.51 0.30 0.09 0.30 0.34 0.20 4.0 3.4
QRPR-HP 0.06 70 0.18 0.83 0.65 0.33 0.50 0.24 0.10 4.9 2.0
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.06 70 0.27 0.82 0.65 0.33 0.50 0.24 0.10 5.2 2.0
M1toGDP-detr 0.06 85 0.23 0.70 0.56 0.27 0.48 0.24 0.10 5.1 2.1
QEPR-cum 0.06 80 0.21 0.84 0.53 0.25 0.48 0.25 0.11 4.9 2.1
SRN-detr 0.06 60 0.29 0.94 0.68 0.36 0.52 0.23 0.09 5.4 1.9
QEPR-HP 0.06 85 0.14 0.77 0.44 0.20 0.45 0.26 0.12 4.6 2.2
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.06 60 0.31 0.96 0.75 0.41 0.54 0.24 0.10 5.0 1.8
QEPR-yoy 0.05 60 0.22 1.00 0.76 0.43 0.56 0.22 0.08 5.4 1.8
PCNtoGDP-HP 0.05 85 0.28 0.68 0.42 0.21 0.49 0.29 0.15 4.5 2.1
globM1-HP 0.04 75 0.16 0.65 0.50 0.26 0.52 0.23 0.09 5.2 1.9
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.04 85 0.17 0.71 0.39 0.19 0.48 0.24 0.10 4.5 2.1
DCR-yoy 0.04 75 0.38 0.60 0.33 0.16 0.48 0.27 0.13 4.4 2.1
DCR-cum 0.04 75 0.37 0.57 0.34 0.17 0.49 0.25 0.10 4.2 2.0
shock-PC 0.04 70 0.40 0.59 0.30 0.14 0.47 0.26 0.11 4.5 2.1
shock-GlobalM1 0.03 80 0.32 0.54 0.23 0.11 0.45 0.27 0.13 4.7 2.2
shock-M1 0.03 70 0.20 0.60 0.36 0.19 0.53 0.26 0.12 4.4 1.9
QRPR-sa-yoy 0.03 75 0.35 0.58 0.34 0.18 0.52 0.22 0.08 3.8 1.9
QRPR-yoy 0.03 70 0.35 0.64 0.40 0.22 0.55 0.20 0.06 4.1 1.8
QRPN-satoGDP-HP 0.02 80 0.28 0.54 0.34 0.19 0.55 0.25 0.11 4.3 1.8
M1toGDP-HP 0.02 80 0.33 0.65 0.40 0.23 0.58 0.22 0.08 5.4 1.7
QRPNtoGDP-HP 0.02 80 0.29 0.52 0.32 0.18 0.57 0.24 0.10 4.3 1.8
globSR-HP 0.02 35 0.33 1.00 0.98 0.63 0.64 0.21 0.06 5.9 1.6
SRR-detr 0.01 75 0.26 0.78 0.54 0.34 0.62 0.19 0.05 4.8 1.6
shock-GlobalPC 0.01 75 0.42 0.44 0.20 0.11 0.56 0.21 0.07 4.4 1.8
M3toGDP-HP 0.01 95 0.30 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.51 0.13 -0.01 4.2 2.0
LRN-HP 0.01 85 0.41 0.41 0.28 0.17 0.60 0.18 0.04 5.6 1.7
globM3-detr 0.01 80 0.16 0.59 0.51 0.32 0.63 0.20 0.06 5.7 1.6
QRPR-cum 0.01 75 0.38 0.50 0.28 0.18 0.63 0.19 0.05 3.5 1.6
QRPR-sa-cum 0.01 65 0.36 0.63 0.42 0.27 0.64 0.18 0.04 4.0 1.6
PCNtoGDP-detr 0.01 95 0.43 0.38 0.21 0.13 0.62 0.22 0.08 4.6 1.6
REX-HP 0.00 80 0.20 0.67 0.32 0.20 0.64 0.19 0.05 3.9 1.6
LRR-HP 0.00 85 0.30 0.29 0.15 0.10 0.64 0.16 0.02 4.8 1.6
shock-GlobalM3 0.00 90 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
SRR-lev 0.00 95 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19
REX-cum 0.00 95 0.25 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.69 0.25 0.11 3.7 1.4
REX-yoy 0.00 95 0.31 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.79 0.16 0.02 3.7 1.3
SRR-HP 0.00 95 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.02 1.15 0.08 -0.08 3.8 0.9
shock-M3 0.00 95 0.40 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.11 0.20 0.04 6.0 0.9
LRR-detr 0.00 95 0.29 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.74 0.16 0.01 3.8 1.4
LRR-lev -0.01 95 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.13
REX-detr -0.01 95 0.45 0.26 0.11 0.09 0.76 0.18 0.03 4.2 1.3
CPI-yoy -0.01 95 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.17
CPI-cum -0.01 95 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.15
spread-lev -0.01 70 0.34 0.66 0.34 0.25 0.72 0.23 0.09 4.7 1.4
globM3-HP -0.01 95 0.38 0.11 0.02 0.03 1.82 0.10 -0.04 2.9 0.5
CONStoGDP-detr -0.01 95 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.06 1.09 0.12 -0.02 4.8 0.9
globSR-detr -0.01 95 0.33 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.78 0.13 -0.02 4.8 0.6
SRN-HP -0.01 95 0.30 0.08 0.02 0.04 1.81 0.06 -0.09 5.2 0.6
CONStoGDP-HP -0.02 95 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.05 1.47 0.10 -0.04 3.0 0.7
M3toGDP-detr -0.02 95 0.26 0.34 0.18 0.15 0.83 0.17 0.03 4.5 1.2
SRN-lev -0.02 95 0.31 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.83 0.23 0.10 5.0 1.2
DCNtoGDP-detr -0.02 90 0.48 0.33 0.24 0.19 0.80 0.18 0.04 5.1 1.2
DCNtoGDP-HP -0.02 85 0.33 0.44 0.23 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.01 4.9 1.2
QRPR-sa-detr -0.02 95 0.42 0.14 0.06 0.08 1.32 0.18 0.04 1.8 0.8
-spread-lev -0.03 95 0.28 0.03 0.00 0.05 12.29 0.02 -0.12 4.0 0.1
QRPN-satoGDP-detr -0.03 95 0.42 0.09 0.04 0.07 1.95 0.12 -0.03 1.6 0.5
QRPNtoGDP-detr -0.03 95 0.45 0.09 0.04 0.07 1.98 0.12 -0.03 1.6 0.5
globSR-lev -0.03 95 0.42 0.05 0.01 0.05 7.64 0.04 -0.10 2.8 0.1
LRN-lev -0.03 95 0.36 0.40 0.26 0.22 0.85 0.21 0.07 4.7 1.2
QRPR-detr -0.03 95 0.46 0.11 0.05 0.08 1.60 0.17 0.03 1.9 0.6
Table 4: θ =0 .4, average results over all countries (same percentile), High-Cost Booms.
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
Percen. Variation called
globPC-HP 0.17 65 0.28 1.00 0.88 0.41 0.46 0.26 0.12 5.5 2.2
GDPR-HP 0.16 45 0.40 1.00 0.93 0.51 0.55 0.23 0.09 5.8 1.8
QAAPR-cum 0.15 40 0.34 1.00 0.95 0.54 0.57 0.23 0.09 5.8 1.8
QAAPR-yoy 0.15 45 0.32 1.00 0.90 0.47 0.53 0.24 0.10 5.7 1.9
QAAPR-HP 0.15 55 0.44 1.00 0.89 0.46 0.52 0.24 0.10 5.8 1.9
INV-cum 0.14 50 0.38 1.00 0.85 0.42 0.49 0.26 0.12 5.5 2.0
globSR-HP 0.14 35 0.36 1.00 0.98 0.63 0.64 0.21 0.06 5.9 1.6
QAAPR-detr 0.13 45 0.43 1.00 0.91 0.53 0.58 0.22 0.08 5.5 1.7
CONS-cum 0.13 40 0.43 0.89 0.83 0.43 0.52 0.25 0.11 5.3 1.9
INV-yoy 0.13 40 0.47 1.00 0.89 0.53 0.59 0.21 0.07 5.8 1.7
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.12 30 0.39 1.00 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.20 0.06 5.9 1.5
INVtoGDP-HP 0.12 45 0.44 1.00 0.88 0.52 0.59 0.22 0.08 5.8 1.7
QEPR-detr 0.12 40 0.33 1.00 0.93 0.61 0.65 0.20 0.06 5.8 1.5
CONS-yoy 0.12 45 0.51 0.98 0.78 0.38 0.49 0.25 0.11 5.2 2.0
LRN-detr 0.12 45 0.46 0.94 0.87 0.52 0.59 0.21 0.07 6.0 1.7
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.11 35 0.47 1.00 0.92 0.61 0.66 0.20 0.06 5.8 1.5
SRN-detr 0.10 40 0.46 0.97 0.87 0.55 0.63 0.20 0.06 5.8 1.6
GDPR-detr 0.10 45 0.45 0.96 0.88 0.57 0.65 0.20 0.06 5.5 1.5
shock-GlobalPC 0.10 5 1.16 1.00 0.98 0.73 0.74 0.18 0.04 6.0 1.3
M1-cum 0.10 40 0.40 0.98 0.92 0.65 0.70 0.19 0.05 5.9 1.4
QRPR-sa-HP 0.09 40 0.63 0.96 0.89 0.59 0.67 0.20 0.06 5.6 1.5
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.09 30 0.51 0.98 0.93 0.66 0.71 0.19 0.05 5.9 1.4
QRPR-HP 0.09 40 0.60 0.97 0.88 0.59 0.67 0.20 0.06 5.6 1.5
QEPR-yoy 0.09 50 0.57 1.00 0.83 0.53 0.63 0.20 0.06 5.6 1.6
INVtoGDP-detr 0.09 45 0.56 0.93 0.83 0.52 0.63 0.20 0.06 5.5 1.6
M1-yoy 0.08 50 0.48 0.97 0.84 0.54 0.65 0.19 0.05 5.6 1.5
QEPR-cum 0.08 45 0.46 0.98 0.87 0.61 0.71 0.18 0.04 5.7 1.4
PCR-yoy 0.08 45 0.68 0.91 0.76 0.45 0.59 0.21 0.07 5.4 1.7
QRPR-yoy 0.07 25 0.51 0.97 0.93 0.71 0.76 0.18 0.04 5.9 1.3
SRN-lev 0.07 30 0.60 0.99 0.93 0.70 0.76 0.18 0.03 5.8 1.3
LRN-lev 0.07 30 0.54 0.98 0.93 0.71 0.76 0.18 0.04 5.8 1.3
QRPR-sa-yoy 0.07 25 0.53 0.97 0.93 0.72 0.77 0.17 0.03 5.8 1.3
globPC-detr 0.07 90 0.66 0.59 0.55 0.15 0.28 0.42 0.28 5.8 3.6
LRR-HP 0.07 35 0.43 1.00 0.94 0.73 0.78 0.18 0.04 5.9 1.3
QRPR-sa-detr 0.07 20 0.60 0.98 0.92 0.71 0.77 0.18 0.03 5.7 1.3
globM3-HP 0.07 20 0.57 1.00 0.92 0.71 0.77 0.17 0.03 5.6 1.3
QRPR-cum 0.07 25 0.55 0.97 0.91 0.69 0.76 0.18 0.04 5.7 1.3
QRPR-sa-cum 0.07 25 0.60 0.97 0.91 0.69 0.76 0.18 0.04 5.7 1.3
QRPR-detr 0.07 15 0.62 1.00 0.95 0.76 0.80 0.17 0.03 5.8 1.3
PCR-cum 0.06 40 0.62 0.91 0.78 0.51 0.65 0.19 0.05 5.5 1.5
PCNtoGDP-HP 0.06 20 0.66 0.99 0.90 0.69 0.77 0.17 0.03 5.8 1.3
globM1-detr 0.06 85 0.44 0.67 0.56 0.20 0.35 0.33 0.19 5.2 2.9
LRR-detr 0.06 45 0.45 0.99 0.91 0.71 0.79 0.17 0.03 5.7 1.3
M3-cum 0.06 35 0.65 0.94 0.83 0.61 0.73 0.18 0.04 5.5 1.4
QRPN-satoGDP-HP 0.06 30 0.65 0.99 0.90 0.71 0.78 0.17 0.03 5.7 1.3
QEPR-HP 0.06 50 0.49 0.96 0.80 0.56 0.70 0.18 0.04 5.7 1.4
QRPNtoGDP-HP 0.06 30 0.59 1.00 0.89 0.70 0.78 0.17 0.03 5.7 1.3
HINV-yoy 0.05 40 0.69 0.99 0.77 0.51 0.67 0.19 0.05 5.1 1.5
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.05 25 0.58 1.00 0.92 0.75 0.81 0.17 0.03 5.7 1.2
SRR-detr 0.05 40 0.42 1.00 0.91 0.74 0.81 0.17 0.02 5.8 1.2
HINV-cum 0.05 20 0.62 1.00 0.92 0.76 0.82 0.16 0.02 5.8 1.2
DCR-cum 0.05 10 0.83 1.00 0.97 0.84 0.86 0.16 0.02 6.0 1.2
globM1-HP 0.05 40 0.61 1.00 0.91 0.75 0.82 0.16 0.02 6.0 1.2
QRPNtoGDP-detr 0.05 10 0.66 1.00 0.96 0.83 0.86 0.16 0.02 5.9 1.2
QRPN-satoGDP-detr 0.04 10 0.68 1.00 0.96 0.83 0.86 0.16 0.02 5.9 1.2
M1toGDP-detr 0.04 80 0.44 0.76 0.63 0.33 0.53 0.22 0.08 5.4 1.9
DCR-yoy 0.04 30 0.81 0.93 0.82 0.62 0.76 0.17 0.03 5.6 1.3
LRN-HP 0.04 15 0.74 1.00 0.96 0.83 0.87 0.16 0.02 6.0 1.1
M3-yoy 0.04 35 0.67 0.94 0.80 0.60 0.75 0.17 0.03 5.5 1.3
spread-lev 0.04 20 0.78 1.00 0.93 0.80 0.86 0.16 0.02 5.8 1.2
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.03 40 0.39 0.97 0.82 0.64 0.79 0.17 0.03 5.6 1.3
REX-HP 0.03 10 0.75 1.00 0.96 0.86 0.89 0.15 0.01 5.9 1.1
REX-yoy 0.03 15 0.74 1.00 0.93 0.82 0.88 0.16 0.02 5.9 1.1
SRR-HP 0.03 30 0.45 0.99 0.89 0.77 0.86 0.16 0.02 5.8 1.2
M1toGDP-HP 0.03 25 0.66 0.98 0.87 0.74 0.85 0.16 0.02 5.6 1.2
SRN-HP 0.03 20 0.62 1.00 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.15 0.01 6.0 1.1
PCNtoGDP-detr 0.03 5 0.93 1.00 0.95 0.85 0.90 0.15 0.01 5.9 1.1
REX-detr 0.03 5 0.94 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.92 0.15 0.01 6.0 1.1
REX-cum 0.02 20 0.67 1.00 0.87 0.75 0.86 0.16 0.02 5.7 1.2
DCNtoGDP-HP 0.02 10 0.84 0.99 0.92 0.82 0.90 0.15 0.01 5.9 1.1
shock-PC 0.02 20 0.70 0.98 0.75 0.57 0.77 0.18 0.04 5.3 1.3
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.02 10 0.79 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.93 0.15 0.01 5.9 1.1
shock-M1 0.01 25 0.67 0.95 0.76 0.62 0.82 0.17 0.02 5.5 1.2
-spread-lev 0.00 5 0.76 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.14 0.00 6.0 1.0
DCNtoGDP-detr 0.00 10 0.86 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.92 0.14 0.00 5.7 1.1
CONStoGDP-HP 0.00 5 0.79 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.14 0.00 6.0 1.0
LRR-lev -0.01 5 1.01 1.00 0.88 0.84 0.95 0.15 0.01 5.8 1.0
M3toGDP-HP -0.01 10 0.95 1.00 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.15 0.01 5.7 1.0
SRR-lev -0.01 5 1.04 1.00 0.88 0.85 0.97 0.15 0.01 5.9 1.0
globM3-detr -0.02 75 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.35 0.65 0.20 0.06 5.9 1.5
shock-M3 -0.03 15 0.88 0.93 0.73 0.66 0.90 0.15 0.01 5.2 1.1
globSR-detr -0.05 5 0.89 1.00 0.87 0.94 1.07 0.13 -0.01 5.9 0.9
M3toGDP-detr -0.05 5 0.66 0.96 0.84 0.90 1.07 0.13 -0.01 5.7 0.9
shock-GlobalM1 -0.06 50 0.74 0.66 0.43 0.31 0.72 0.18 0.04 5.2 1.4
CPI-yoy -0.07 5 1.24 0.96 0.73 0.76 1.04 0.13 -0.01 5.6 1.0
globSR-lev -0.08 5 1.17 0.85 0.61 0.62 1.01 0.14 -0.01 5.7 1.0
CONStoGDP-detr -0.08 5 1.15 1.00 0.82 0.94 1.14 0.13 -0.01 5.7 0.9
shock-GlobalM3 -0.10 5 1.03 0.79 0.59 0.63 1.06 0.15 0.00 4.8 0.9
CPI-cum -0.10 5 1.27 0.91 0.67 0.74 1.11 0.13 -0.01 5.5 0.9
Table 5: θ =0 .6, average results over all countries (same percentile), High-Cost Booms.
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
Percen. Variation called
globPC-detr 0.02 95 0.02 0.63 0.48 0.10 0.20 0.59 0.43 5.2 5.1
LRN-detr 0.01 90 0.04 0.64 0.48 0.10 0.21 0.50 0.35 4.3 4.7
HINV-yoy 0.01 90 0.08 0.30 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.29 0.21 1.5 8.1
SRN-detr 0.01 90 0.14 0.44 0.29 0.06 0.21 0.33 0.17 3.6 4.7
HINV-cum 0.01 95 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.15 1.3 10.8
INV-yoy 0.00 95 0.06 0.36 0.11 0.02 0.20 0.33 0.19 1.7 5.0
globPC-HP 0.00 95 0.04 0.22 0.08 0.02 0.19 0.51 0.36 2.1 5.2
CONS-cum 0.00 95 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.9 7.5
SRR-lev 0.00 85 0.19 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.22 1.6 5.7
CPI-yoy 0.00 95 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
shock-GlobalM3 0.00 90 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
CPI-cum 0.00 95 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
PCR-yoy 0.00 95 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.26 0.25 0.13 0.8 3.8
shock-GlobalPC 0.00 95 0.11 0.27 0.07 0.02 0.27 0.29 0.13 2.1 3.7
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.00 95 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.36 0.07 0.05 0.1 2.7
globM1-detr 0.00 95 0.04 0.46 0.31 0.08 0.26 0.43 0.27 3.9 3.8
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.00 95 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.31 0.23 0.07 1.0 3.2
CONS-yoy 0.00 95 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.40 0.19 0.08 1.1 2.5
LRR-HP -0.01 85 0.05 0.51 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.33 0.17 3.3 3.7
SRR-HP -0.01 95 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.74 0.01 -0.07 0.1 0.6
shock-PC -0.01 95 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.02 -0.04 0.1 1.1
PCR-cum -0.01 95 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.45 0.18 0.06 0.6 2.2
QEPR-detr -0.01 95 0.04 0.75 0.56 0.15 0.27 0.38 0.22 5.1 3.8
shock-GlobalM1 -0.01 95 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.54 0.20 0.07 0.4 1.9
LRN-HP -0.01 95 0.04 0.39 0.19 0.06 0.30 0.22 0.12 2.9 3.4
shock-M1 -0.01 95 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.62 0.34 0.19 1.7 1.6
spread-lev -0.01 95 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.69 0.08 0.02 0.4 1.4
shock-M3 -0.01 95 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.79 0.19 0.08 1.1 0.6
INV-cum -0.01 95 0.07 0.41 0.10 0.04 0.37 0.28 0.14 2.2 2.7
INVtoGDP-detr -0.01 95 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.36 0.33 0.17 1.6 2.8
globM1-HP -0.01 95 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.67 0.20 0.07 0.4 1.5
-spread-lev -0.01 95 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 12.81 0.00 -0.03 0.1 0.1
M3-yoy -0.01 95 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.09 0.05 -0.02 0.3 0.9
M1-cum -0.01 95 0.12 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.42 0.18 0.09 1.4 2.4
M3-cum -0.01 95 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.04 -0.03 0.3 1.0
QEPR-yoy -0.01 95 0.02 0.53 0.22 0.07 0.33 0.32 0.17 3.4 3.0
QEPR-cum -0.01 95 0.03 0.59 0.26 0.08 0.32 0.34 0.19 3.6 3.1
globSR-HP -0.01 90 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 1.40 0.19 0.03 0.8 0.7
QEPNtoGDP-detr -0.01 95 0.00 0.66 0.52 0.15 0.29 0.36 0.20 5.2 3.5
DCR-cum -0.02 95 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.83 0.02 -0.10 0.1 0.5
CONStoGDP-HP -0.02 95 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.99 0.09 -0.06 0.5 1.0
SRN-HP -0.02 95 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.02 5.59 0.01 -0.08 0.2 0.2
REX-HP -0.02 95 0.04 0.24 0.05 0.03 0.71 0.27 0.17 1.1 1.4
LRR-lev -0.02 95 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.0
globM3-HP -0.02 95 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.03 1.19 0.17 0.01 1.4 0.8
INVtoGDP-HP -0.02 95 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.03 5.54 0.04 -0.07 0.0 0.2
CONStoGDP-detr -0.02 95 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.03 1.38 0.19 0.03 0.9 0.7
DCR-yoy -0.02 95 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.03 2.95 0.02 -0.12 0.1 0.3
REX-cum -0.02 95 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.91 0.11 -0.02 1.0 1.1
globSR-detr -0.02 95 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.03 1.40 0.19 0.03 0.9 0.7
QRPNtoGDP-HP -0.03 95 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QRPR-sa-HP -0.03 95 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.0
M1-yoy -0.03 95 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.06 0.65 0.15 0.06 0.9 1.5
QRPN-satoGDP-HP -0.03 95 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.0
REX-yoy -0.03 95 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.81 0.06 -0.07 0.9 0.6
GDPR-detr -0.03 95 0.06 0.50 0.21 0.09 0.43 0.32 0.17 2.5 2.3
QRPR-HP -0.03 95 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.05 1.98 0.09 -0.01 0.2 0.5
M1toGDP-HP -0.03 95 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.04 5.06 0.07 -0.03 0.2 0.2
M1toGDP-detr -0.04 95 0.05 0.67 0.32 0.12 0.39 0.31 0.15 4.1 2.6
QEPNtoGDP-HP -0.04 95 0.02 0.35 0.13 0.08 0.60 0.16 0.02 2.1 1.7
QRPR-yoy -0.04 95 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QRPR-sa-yoy -0.04 95 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QEPR-HP -0.04 95 0.02 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.49 0.23 0.07 3.5 2.1
globSR-lev -0.04 95 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 6.34 0.06 -0.09 0.6 0.2
SRR-detr -0.04 95 0.06 0.30 0.10 0.07 0.72 0.14 0.04 1.8 1.4
M3toGDP-HP -0.04 95 0.02 0.36 0.09 0.07 0.79 0.12 -0.04 1.9 1.3
REX-detr -0.04 95 0.04 0.25 0.11 0.08 0.70 0.20 0.06 3.4 1.4
QRPR-cum -0.04 95 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QRPR-sa-cum -0.04 95 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QAAPR-cum -0.04 95 0.06 0.36 0.13 0.09 0.64 0.24 0.09 1.8 1.6
GDPR-HP -0.05 95 0.08 0.16 0.03 0.07 1.99 0.02 -0.09 0.4 0.5
globM3-detr -0.05 95 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.07 2.36 0.05 -0.11 0.4 0.4
PCNtoGDP-HP -0.05 95 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.08 1.20 0.11 0.01 0.9 0.8
QAAPR-yoy -0.05 90 0.07 0.65 0.23 0.13 0.54 0.29 0.13 3.2 1.9
QAAPR-HP -0.06 90 0.13 0.52 0.20 0.12 0.61 0.28 0.12 2.1 1.6
QAAPNtoGDP-HP -0.06 95 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.08 2.92 0.05 -0.10 0.3 0.3
LRR-detr -0.07 95 0.02 0.27 0.09 0.10 1.16 0.14 -0.01 1.5 0.9
QAAPR-detr -0.07 95 0.03 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.99 0.21 0.05 0.9 1.0
QAAPNtoGDP-detr -0.07 95 0.11 0.23 0.08 0.11 1.35 0.18 0.03 0.7 0.7
QRPR-detr -0.07 95 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.10 5.37 0.15 -0.01 0.1 0.2
QRPR-sa-detr -0.07 95 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.10 5.39 0.15 -0.01 0.1 0.2
QRPN-satoGDP-detr -0.08 95 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.13 0.0
QRPNtoGDP-detr -0.08 95 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.13 0.0
PCNtoGDP-detr -0.09 95 0.06 0.32 0.23 0.16 0.72 0.20 0.04 3.2 1.4
DCNtoGDP-HP -0.09 95 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.11 10.12 0.02 -0.14 0.1 0.1
M3toGDP-detr -0.09 95 0.02 0.25 0.09 0.13 1.47 0.10 -0.05 1.7 0.7
SRN-lev -0.09 95 0.04 0.46 0.21 0.17 0.79 0.31 0.15 3.1 1.3
LRN-lev -0.13 95 0.12 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.88 0.24 0.08 3.5 1.1
DCNtoGDP-detr -0.13 95 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.18 3.27 0.05 -0.11 2.0 0.3
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
Percen. Variation called
globPC-detr 0.17 90 0.38 0.63 0.63 0.14 0.23 0.51 0.35 5.5 4.4
globPC-HP 0.14 70 0.12 0.94 0.85 0.34 0.39 0.31 0.15 5.9 2.5
QEPR-detr 0.14 90 0.22 0.82 0.69 0.23 0.33 0.34 0.18 5.7 3.0
M1toGDP-detr 0.14 85 0.31 0.84 0.73 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.16 5.5 2.8
LRN-detr 0.13 90 0.25 0.64 0.48 0.10 0.21 0.50 0.35 4.3 4.7
globM1-detr 0.12 85 0.06 0.74 0.61 0.20 0.33 0.35 0.19 4.8 3.0
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.12 95 0.24 0.66 0.52 0.15 0.29 0.36 0.20 5.2 3.5
INV-yoy 0.12 70 0.17 1.00 0.61 0.21 0.35 0.33 0.17 4.8 2.9
M1-cum 0.11 65 0.24 0.92 0.80 0.35 0.44 0.28 0.13 5.7 2.3
INV-cum 0.10 70 0.21 0.99 0.57 0.21 0.36 0.32 0.17 4.6 2.8
QAAPR-HP 0.10 60 0.20 1.00 0.78 0.35 0.45 0.28 0.13 5.6 2.2
INVtoGDP-HP 0.10 60 0.18 1.00 0.80 0.37 0.46 0.30 0.14 5.1 2.2
QEPR-yoy 0.10 70 0.20 0.99 0.77 0.35 0.46 0.27 0.12 5.1 2.2
SRN-detr 0.09 80 0.27 0.56 0.48 0.16 0.34 0.28 0.12 4.2 2.9
QEPR-cum 0.09 80 0.20 0.77 0.63 0.27 0.43 0.28 0.12 5.8 2.3
QAAPR-yoy 0.09 45 0.27 1.00 0.84 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.11 5.6 2.0
M1-yoy 0.09 65 0.16 0.87 0.72 0.33 0.46 0.28 0.12 5.8 2.2
HINV-yoy 0.09 75 0.10 0.61 0.39 0.12 0.30 0.33 0.18 3.9 3.3
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.08 70 0.40 0.95 0.66 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.13 5.1 2.2
CONS-cum 0.08 55 0.27 0.73 0.46 0.18 0.39 0.30 0.14 4.1 2.5
CONS-yoy 0.07 55 0.21 0.90 0.51 0.21 0.42 0.27 0.12 4.2 2.4
QAAPR-cum 0.07 50 0.29 1.00 0.77 0.39 0.51 0.27 0.11 5.1 2.0
LRR-HP 0.07 85 0.29 0.51 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.33 0.17 3.3 3.7
HINV-cum 0.06 80 0.10 0.58 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.34 0.18 2.9 3.6
GDPR-HP 0.06 55 0.31 1.00 0.80 0.43 0.54 0.25 0.10 5.4 1.9
LRN-HP 0.06 90 0.26 0.42 0.36 0.14 0.39 0.19 0.03 3.4 2.5
QEPR-HP 0.05 80 0.17 0.78 0.57 0.29 0.51 0.25 0.09 5.5 1.9
shock-GlobalPC 0.04 70 0.48 0.65 0.31 0.14 0.45 0.27 0.11 3.8 2.2
shock-M1 0.04 70 0.26 0.58 0.36 0.18 0.50 0.34 0.19 3.3 2.0
GDPR-detr 0.04 85 0.12 0.57 0.38 0.20 0.51 0.31 0.15 3.7 2.0
globSR-HP 0.03 40 0.27 1.00 0.93 0.57 0.61 0.24 0.08 6.0 1.7
PCR-yoy 0.03 70 0.33 0.49 0.32 0.15 0.49 0.30 0.14 3.2 2.0
SRR-detr 0.03 85 0.28 0.72 0.34 0.17 0.51 0.26 0.10 4.0 2.0
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.03 80 0.19 0.77 0.50 0.28 0.56 0.24 0.08 5.3 1.8
REX-HP 0.03 90 0.16 0.47 0.21 0.09 0.42 0.26 0.10 2.3 2.4
PCR-cum 0.03 60 0.25 0.68 0.49 0.27 0.56 0.26 0.10 4.9 1.8
globM1-HP 0.03 75 0.13 0.69 0.51 0.29 0.57 0.22 0.06 4.8 1.8
M1toGDP-HP 0.03 65 0.26 0.91 0.71 0.43 0.61 0.22 0.06 5.8 1.7
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.02 80 0.16 0.46 0.18 0.08 0.45 0.26 0.10 2.0 2.2
INVtoGDP-detr 0.02 95 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.36 0.33 0.17 1.6 2.8
spread-lev 0.02 65 0.33 0.92 0.47 0.28 0.59 0.25 0.10 5.2 1.7
QRPR-HP 0.02 60 0.19 0.80 0.58 0.35 0.61 0.20 0.05 4.6 1.6
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.02 70 0.29 0.81 0.57 0.35 0.61 0.20 0.05 4.5 1.6
globM3-detr 0.02 75 0.10 0.63 0.55 0.33 0.61 0.22 0.06 5.4 1.6
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.02 95 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.31 0.23 0.07 1.0 3.2
QRPR-sa-HP 0.01 60 0.24 0.75 0.56 0.35 0.62 0.18 0.03 3.9 1.6
shock-PC 0.01 65 0.41 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.58 0.24 0.08 2.6 1.7
SRR-lev 0.01 85 0.26 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.22 1.6 5.7
PCNtoGDP-HP 0.01 85 0.39 0.64 0.35 0.22 0.64 0.24 0.08 3.6 1.6
SRN-HP 0.01 75 0.26 0.39 0.27 0.17 0.64 0.12 -0.04 2.3 1.6
shock-GlobalM1 0.00 95 0.24 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.54 0.20 0.07 0.4 1.9
DCR-yoy 0.00 40 0.42 0.94 0.71 0.47 0.66 0.21 0.05 5.6 1.5
REX-detr 0.00 90 0.47 0.44 0.18 0.12 0.65 0.29 0.14 3.8 1.5
QAAPR-detr 0.00 35 0.46 1.00 0.83 0.55 0.66 0.22 0.06 5.3 1.5
CPI-cum 0.00 90 0.36 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.53 0.19 0.12 0.4 1.9
M3-cum 0.00 35 0.36 0.95 0.84 0.56 0.66 0.21 0.05 5.7 1.5
CONStoGDP-detr 0.00 90 0.12 0.34 0.13 0.08 0.65 0.28 0.12 2.1 1.5
CPI-yoy 0.00 90 0.55 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.62 0.19 0.06 0.6 1.6
shock-GlobalM3 0.00 90 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
REX-yoy 0.00 90 0.34 0.31 0.10 0.07 0.69 0.22 0.07 1.6 1.4
globM3-HP 0.00 90 0.38 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.69 0.26 0.11 2.1 1.4
CONStoGDP-HP 0.00 90 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.73 0.23 0.07 2.6 1.4
M3-yoy 0.00 90 0.31 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.76 0.10 -0.02 0.6 1.3
SRR-HP 0.00 95 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.74 0.01 -0.07 0.1 0.6
REX-cum 0.00 80 0.19 0.46 0.23 0.16 0.69 0.18 0.03 3.3 1.4
shock-M3 -0.01 95 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.79 0.19 0.08 1.1 0.6
M3toGDP-HP -0.01 95 0.34 0.36 0.09 0.07 0.79 0.12 -0.04 1.9 1.3
PCNtoGDP-detr -0.01 95 0.30 0.32 0.23 0.16 0.72 0.20 0.04 3.2 1.4
DCR-cum -0.01 95 0.40 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.83 0.02 -0.10 0.1 0.5
-spread-lev -0.01 95 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.02 12.81 0.00 -0.03 0.1 0.1
globSR-detr -0.01 95 0.37 0.06 0.02 0.03 1.40 0.19 0.03 0.9 0.7
QRPNtoGDP-HP -0.01 80 0.36 0.47 0.22 0.17 0.78 0.18 0.02 1.9 1.3
LRR-lev -0.02 95 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.0
SRN-lev -0.02 95 0.30 0.46 0.21 0.17 0.79 0.31 0.15 3.1 1.3
QRPN-satoGDP-HP -0.02 80 0.32 0.47 0.22 0.18 0.81 0.16 0.01 1.9 1.2
LRR-detr -0.03 95 0.24 0.27 0.09 0.10 1.16 0.14 -0.01 1.5 0.9
globSR-lev -0.03 95 0.57 0.06 0.01 0.05 6.34 0.06 -0.09 0.6 0.2
QRPR-yoy -0.03 95 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QRPR-sa-yoy -0.03 95 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QRPR-cum -0.03 95 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
QRPR-sa-cum -0.03 95 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.0
LRN-lev -0.03 95 0.41 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.88 0.24 0.08 3.5 1.1
DCNtoGDP-detr -0.03 40 0.39 0.82 0.72 0.54 0.74 0.19 0.04 5.7 1.3
DCNtoGDP-HP -0.04 85 0.40 0.36 0.17 0.17 1.02 0.11 -0.04 2.1 1.0
M3toGDP-detr -0.04 95 0.35 0.25 0.09 0.13 1.47 0.10 -0.05 1.7 0.7
QRPR-detr -0.05 95 0.52 0.05 0.02 0.10 5.37 0.15 -0.01 0.1 0.2
QRPR-sa-detr -0.05 95 0.44 0.05 0.02 0.10 5.39 0.15 -0.01 0.1 0.2
QRPN-satoGDP-detr -0.06 95 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.13 0.0
QRPNtoGDP-detr -0.06 95 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.13 0.0
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
Percen. Variation called
globPC-HP 0.18 70 0.37 0.94 0.85 0.34 0.39 0.31 0.15 5.9 2.5
QAAPR-cum 0.17 35 0.28 1.00 0.98 0.55 0.56 0.25 0.09 6.0 1.8
QAAPR-HP 0.16 40 0.44 1.00 0.93 0.49 0.53 0.25 0.09 6.0 1.9
GDPR-HP 0.16 25 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.61 0.23 0.08 6.0 1.6
M1-cum 0.15 55 0.30 1.00 0.89 0.45 0.50 0.26 0.10 5.9 2.0
globSR-HP 0.15 35 0.27 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.62 0.23 0.07 6.0 1.6
M1toGDP-detr 0.15 80 0.45 0.90 0.80 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.14 5.7 2.4
QAAPR-yoy 0.15 35 0.27 1.00 0.94 0.54 0.58 0.24 0.08 5.9 1.7
INVtoGDP-HP 0.14 55 0.37 1.00 0.85 0.42 0.50 0.28 0.13 5.4 2.0
INV-cum 0.14 40 0.35 1.00 0.93 0.55 0.60 0.24 0.08 5.8 1.7
QEPR-detr 0.14 85 0.40 0.82 0.74 0.27 0.37 0.32 0.16 5.7 2.7
LRN-detr 0.13 45 0.63 0.98 0.88 0.51 0.57 0.24 0.08 5.9 1.7
QEPR-yoy 0.12 65 0.34 0.99 0.80 0.39 0.49 0.26 0.11 5.1 2.0
INV-yoy 0.12 35 0.32 1.00 0.95 0.62 0.65 0.22 0.06 5.8 1.5
M1-yoy 0.12 45 0.42 1.00 0.91 0.56 0.62 0.22 0.06 6.0 1.6
LRR-HP 0.12 55 0.49 1.00 0.88 0.52 0.59 0.24 0.09 5.6 1.7
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.12 30 0.47 1.00 0.95 0.62 0.66 0.21 0.06 5.9 1.5
globPC-detr 0.12 90 0.77 0.63 0.63 0.14 0.23 0.51 0.35 5.5 4.4
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.11 50 0.48 1.00 0.82 0.44 0.54 0.24 0.09 5.8 1.9
QAAPR-detr 0.11 15 0.50 1.00 0.97 0.68 0.70 0.21 0.05 6.0 1.4
shock-GlobalPC 0.11 5 1.17 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.73 0.20 0.04 6.0 1.4
M1toGDP-HP 0.10 35 0.61 0.99 0.95 0.67 0.70 0.21 0.05 6.0 1.4
SRN-detr 0.10 40 0.46 1.00 0.86 0.54 0.63 0.22 0.06 6.0 1.6
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.10 75 0.65 0.82 0.71 0.31 0.45 0.28 0.12 5.7 2.2
QEPR-cum 0.09 65 0.44 0.88 0.77 0.42 0.55 0.24 0.08 5.3 1.8
LRR-detr 0.09 45 0.39 1.00 0.96 0.70 0.74 0.21 0.05 5.9 1.4
CONS-cum 0.09 15 0.44 1.00 0.95 0.71 0.74 0.20 0.05 5.9 1.4
SRN-lev 0.09 35 0.53 1.00 0.96 0.72 0.75 0.19 0.04 6.0 1.3
globM1-detr 0.08 85 0.58 0.74 0.61 0.20 0.33 0.35 0.19 4.8 3.0
M3-cum 0.08 35 0.71 0.95 0.84 0.56 0.66 0.21 0.05 5.7 1.5
DCR-yoy 0.08 30 0.77 0.94 0.84 0.57 0.68 0.21 0.05 5.8 1.5
spread-lev 0.08 35 0.54 1.00 0.91 0.67 0.74 0.20 0.04 6.0 1.3
DCR-cum 0.07 30 0.82 0.98 0.85 0.60 0.70 0.20 0.05 5.6 1.4
PCR-yoy 0.07 25 0.66 1.00 0.89 0.66 0.74 0.20 0.04 5.8 1.4
CONS-yoy 0.07 40 0.49 0.95 0.70 0.37 0.53 0.26 0.11 4.6 1.9
LRN-lev 0.07 30 0.52 0.98 0.95 0.75 0.79 0.18 0.03 6.0 1.3
SRR-detr 0.07 30 0.38 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.81 0.19 0.03 6.0 1.2
globM3-HP 0.07 20 0.70 1.00 0.92 0.71 0.77 0.19 0.03 5.8 1.3
PCR-cum 0.07 30 0.54 1.00 0.85 0.61 0.72 0.20 0.05 5.5 1.4
REX-detr 0.06 15 0.82 1.00 0.97 0.80 0.83 0.18 0.03 5.9 1.2
PCNtoGDP-HP 0.06 10 0.71 1.00 0.97 0.81 0.83 0.18 0.03 5.9 1.2
QRPR-sa-HP 0.06 20 0.88 1.00 0.95 0.79 0.83 0.18 0.02 5.9 1.2
HINV-cum 0.06 20 0.46 1.00 0.96 0.80 0.83 0.18 0.03 5.9 1.2
QEPR-HP 0.05 70 0.44 0.83 0.70 0.43 0.61 0.22 0.06 5.7 1.6
M3-yoy 0.05 20 0.73 1.00 0.93 0.77 0.83 0.18 0.02 5.9 1.2
QRPR-HP 0.05 5 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.05 20 0.47 1.00 0.99 0.87 0.88 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
QRPNtoGDP-HP 0.04 10 0.68 1.00 0.99 0.88 0.89 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
QRPN-satoGDP-HP 0.04 10 0.78 1.00 0.99 0.89 0.90 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
QRPR-sa-cum 0.04 5 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.04 65 0.23 0.83 0.69 0.44 0.64 0.21 0.05 5.7 1.6
INVtoGDP-detr 0.04 10 0.59 1.00 0.96 0.85 0.88 0.17 0.02 5.9 1.1
QRPR-cum 0.04 10 0.43 1.00 0.97 0.86 0.89 0.17 0.02 5.9 1.1
QRPR-detr 0.04 5 0.73 1.00 0.96 0.85 0.88 0.17 0.02 5.9 1.1
GDPR-detr 0.04 5 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
REX-cum 0.03 20 0.68 1.00 0.91 0.78 0.86 0.18 0.02 5.8 1.2
QRPR-sa-detr 0.03 5 0.67 1.00 0.96 0.86 0.89 0.17 0.01 5.9 1.1
LRN-HP 0.03 15 0.87 1.00 0.94 0.83 0.89 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
HINV-yoy 0.03 15 0.54 1.00 0.98 0.90 0.92 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
globM3-detr 0.03 45 0.65 0.85 0.74 0.55 0.74 0.19 0.04 4.8 1.4
QRPR-yoy 0.02 10 0.52 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.91 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
QRPR-sa-yoy 0.02 10 0.56 1.00 0.95 0.87 0.91 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
PCNtoGDP-detr 0.02 5 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.93 0.16 0.01 5.9 1.1
DCNtoGDP-detr 0.02 35 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.56 0.76 0.19 0.03 5.8 1.3
M3toGDP-HP 0.02 10 0.71 1.00 0.91 0.81 0.89 0.17 0.02 5.8 1.1
REX-yoy 0.02 5 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.16 0.01 6.0 1.1
SRR-HP 0.02 40 0.47 0.95 0.77 0.62 0.80 0.18 0.02 5.9 1.3
QRPN-satoGDP-detr 0.02 5 0.84 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.92 0.17 0.01 5.9 1.1
QRPNtoGDP-detr 0.02 5 0.77 1.00 0.94 0.87 0.92 0.17 0.01 5.9 1.1
DCNtoGDP-HP 0.01 5 1.01 1.00 0.92 0.84 0.91 0.17 0.01 6.0 1.1
globM1-HP 0.01 60 0.69 0.86 0.69 0.50 0.72 0.19 0.03 5.5 1.4
SRN-HP 0.01 10 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.16 0.00 6.0 1.0
REX-HP 0.01 10 0.74 1.00 0.94 0.89 0.95 0.16 0.01 5.8 1.1
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.00 10 0.75 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.16 0.01 5.9 1.0
-spread-lev 0.00 10 0.56 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.16 0.00 6.0 1.0
CONStoGDP-HP 0.00 5 0.57 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.16 0.00 6.0 1.0
shock-PC -0.01 20 0.69 0.93 0.71 0.57 0.81 0.19 0.03 5.3 1.2
shock-M1 -0.01 55 0.63 0.80 0.52 0.31 0.59 0.29 0.13 4.9 1.7
CPI-yoy -0.02 5 1.48 0.98 0.81 0.77 0.95 0.16 0.01 5.7 1.1
CPI-cum -0.03 5 1.30 0.95 0.79 0.75 0.95 0.16 0.01 5.7 1.1
LRR-lev -0.03 5 0.98 1.00 0.83 0.82 0.98 0.17 0.01 5.8 1.0
globSR-detr -0.03 5 0.68 1.00 0.91 0.93 1.03 0.16 0.00 6.0 1.0
CONStoGDP-detr -0.03 5 1.35 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.04 0.16 0.00 5.9 1.0
SRR-lev -0.03 15 0.96 0.78 0.74 0.69 0.94 0.18 0.02 4.6 1.1
globSR-lev -0.05 10 1.16 0.69 0.58 0.49 0.85 0.17 0.02 5.1 1.2
M3toGDP-detr -0.06 5 0.62 0.99 0.84 0.91 1.08 0.14 -0.01 5.7 0.9
shock-GlobalM1 -0.07 5 0.73 1.00 0.80 0.86 1.08 0.14 -0.01 5.5 0.9
shock-M3 -0.10 20 1.00 0.80 0.56 0.59 1.04 0.16 0.00 4.7 1.0
shock-GlobalM3 -0.11 5 1.19 0.68 0.56 0.62 1.10 0.17 0.01 3.7 0.9
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
called
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.22 0.98 0.83 0.18 0.22 0.41 0.29 5.4 4.6
QAAPR-HP 0.21 1.00 0.91 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.26 5.8 3.5
QAAPR-yoy 0.17 1.00 0.83 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.18 5.1 3.1
QAAPR-detr 0.16 0.98 0.84 0.29 0.35 0.34 0.23 5.2 2.9
QAAPR-cum 0.16 0.98 0.87 0.31 0.36 0.32 0.20 5.4 2.8
QRPR-sa-HP 0.15 1.00 0.88 0.34 0.38 0.25 0.14 6.0 2.6
QRPN-satoGDP-HP 0.15 0.75 0.63 0.18 0.28 0.27 0.15 5.9 3.6
QRPR-HP 0.14 1.00 0.95 0.40 0.42 0.24 0.13 6.0 2.4
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.14 0.83 0.78 0.28 0.36 0.38 0.26 4.7 2.8
QRPNtoGDP-HP 0.14 0.75 0.62 0.18 0.28 0.40 0.30 5.8 3.5
QEPR-detr 0.13 0.98 0.84 0.34 0.40 0.28 0.17 5.2 2.5
QRPR-yoy 0.13 0.88 0.76 0.29 0.38 0.30 0.18 5.9 2.6
QRPR-sa-cum 0.13 0.88 0.79 0.31 0.39 0.27 0.15 6.0 2.5
QRPR-sa-yoy 0.13 1.00 0.87 0.36 0.42 0.28 0.17 5.8 2.4
INVtoGDP-HP 0.13 0.96 0.80 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.23 5.9 2.5
LRR-lev 0.13 0.63 0.59 0.18 0.31 0.27 0.17 5.8 3.2
QEPR-HP 0.13 0.90 0.70 0.25 0.36 0.29 0.18 4.4 2.8
globPC-HP 0.13 0.85 0.70 0.26 0.37 0.40 0.29 5.3 2.7
LRN-HP 0.12 0.94 0.85 0.36 0.42 0.27 0.16 5.7 2.4
QRPR-cum 0.12 0.88 0.79 0.32 0.41 0.21 0.10 6.0 2.5
QRPR-sa-detr 0.12 0.88 0.85 0.36 0.43 0.23 0.12 5.9 2.3
QRPN-satoGDP-detr 0.12 0.88 0.88 0.38 0.43 0.22 0.11 6.0 2.3
QRPR-detr 0.12 0.88 0.78 0.32 0.42 0.23 0.12 5.7 2.4
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.12 0.90 0.61 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.28 3.9 2.9
shock-GlobalPC 0.11 0.73 0.66 0.25 0.38 0.30 0.19 6.0 2.6
SRR-lev 0.11 0.50 0.46 0.13 0.27 0.29 0.17 5.9 3.6
INV-cum 0.11 0.83 0.68 0.27 0.40 0.23 0.12 6.0 2.5
QRPNtoGDP-detr 0.11 0.88 0.84 0.38 0.46 0.22 0.10 6.0 2.2
globSR-detr 0.10 0.63 0.59 0.22 0.38 0.16 0.05 6.0 2.6
globSR-lev 0.10 0.38 0.42 0.11 0.26 0.22 0.11 6.0 3.9
QEPR-yoy 0.10 0.94 0.70 0.29 0.42 0.31 0.19 4.6 2.4
CPI-cum 0.10 0.50 0.49 0.16 0.33 0.33 0.21 6.0 3.1
globM3-HP 0.10 0.63 0.47 0.15 0.33 0.20 0.09 5.4 3.1
SRN-lev 0.10 0.63 0.54 0.20 0.37 0.30 0.18 5.7 2.7
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.09 0.85 0.80 0.37 0.47 0.21 0.10 5.2 2.1
GDPR-HP 0.09 0.88 0.69 0.30 0.44 0.25 0.13 5.3 2.3
shock-GlobalM3 0.09 0.50 0.39 0.10 0.26 0.33 0.22 5.8 3.8
CPI-yoy 0.09 0.38 0.32 0.07 0.20 0.36 0.23 6.0 5.0
PCNtoGDP-HP 0.09 0.75 0.67 0.30 0.45 0.24 0.13 5.9 2.2
PCR-yoy 0.08 0.63 0.49 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.12 4.8 2.5
INVtoGDP-detr 0.08 1.00 0.93 0.49 0.52 0.22 0.10 5.9 1.9
INV-yoy 0.08 0.83 0.54 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.16 5.1 2.4
QEPR-cum 0.08 0.83 0.66 0.31 0.47 0.22 0.11 4.2 2.1
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.07 1.00 0.82 0.42 0.52 0.25 0.14 5.8 1.9
LRN-lev 0.07 0.58 0.50 0.21 0.43 0.21 0.10 5.6 2.3
M1toGDP-HP 0.07 0.92 0.70 0.35 0.50 0.22 0.10 5.2 2.0
GDPR-detr 0.07 0.88 0.83 0.44 0.53 0.19 0.08 6.0 1.9
LRR-HP 0.07 0.52 0.34 0.12 0.35 0.25 0.14 5.0 2.9
globSR-HP 0.07 0.75 0.64 0.31 0.49 0.18 0.06 5.7 2.0
DCNtoGDP-HP 0.07 0.63 0.57 0.27 0.48 0.23 0.11 5.6 2.1
REX-detr 0.06 0.67 0.57 0.27 0.48 0.19 0.08 6.0 2.1
spread-lev 0.06 0.44 0.33 0.11 0.34 0.22 0.11 5.8 3.0
CONS-cum 0.06 0.50 0.36 0.15 0.40 0.35 0.21 5.2 2.5
shock-M3 0.06 0.63 0.48 0.22 0.47 0.25 0.13 5.8 2.1
CONS-yoy 0.06 0.50 0.40 0.17 0.43 0.35 0.22 5.5 2.3
PCR-cum 0.05 0.58 0.45 0.21 0.47 0.24 0.13 4.4 2.1
M1-yoy 0.05 0.56 0.37 0.16 0.43 0.21 0.10 5.2 2.3
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.05 0.75 0.66 0.36 0.54 0.16 0.05 6.0 1.8
globM1-HP 0.05 0.58 0.48 0.24 0.50 0.15 0.04 5.6 2.0
LRN-detr 0.05 0.81 0.75 0.42 0.56 0.22 0.10 5.9 1.8
REX-cum 0.04 0.58 0.44 0.22 0.50 0.16 0.05 5.3 2.0
HINV-cum 0.04 0.75 0.50 0.27 0.53 0.16 0.05 5.9 1.9
DCR-yoy 0.04 0.38 0.33 0.15 0.47 0.17 0.06 5.7 2.1
shock-PC 0.04 0.46 0.24 0.10 0.41 0.30 0.19 4.7 2.4
M1-cum 0.04 0.63 0.42 0.22 0.52 0.18 0.06 5.3 1.9
SRN-detr 0.04 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.53 0.15 0.04 4.7 1.9
M1toGDP-detr 0.03 0.69 0.60 0.34 0.57 0.18 0.07 5.7 1.8
SRR-detr 0.03 0.56 0.48 0.26 0.55 0.15 0.04 5.9 1.8
HINV-yoy 0.03 0.71 0.55 0.31 0.57 0.15 0.04 5.5 1.8
DCR-cum 0.03 0.38 0.33 0.17 0.52 0.15 0.03 5.3 1.9
-spread-lev 0.03 0.42 0.33 0.17 0.53 0.14 0.04 6.0 1.9
SRR-HP 0.03 0.44 0.27 0.14 0.51 0.12 0.00 5.8 2.0
REX-yoy 0.02 0.48 0.26 0.14 0.52 0.14 0.03 5.8 1.9
SRN-HP 0.02 0.38 0.20 0.10 0.50 0.11 0.00 4.3 2.0
shock-M1 0.02 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.54 0.13 0.01 5.6 1.9
REX-HP 0.02 0.38 0.28 0.16 0.56 0.10 -0.02 5.9 1.8
shock-GlobalM1 0.02 0.38 0.25 0.14 0.55 0.10 0.00 5.2 1.8
CONStoGDP-detr 0.02 0.50 0.39 0.23 0.59 0.09 -0.02 5.8 1.7
globM3-detr 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.57 0.06 -0.06 6.0 1.8
M3-yoy 0.01 0.48 0.31 0.20 0.62 0.11 0.00 4.1 1.6
CONStoGDP-HP 0.00 0.38 0.27 0.17 0.64 0.06 -0.05 5.7 1.6
M3-cum 0.00 0.25 0.16 0.10 0.65 0.06 -0.04 4.5 1.5
DCNtoGDP-detr 0.00 0.44 0.41 0.27 0.66 0.11 0.00 6.0 1.5
PCNtoGDP-detr 0.00 0.44 0.43 0.29 0.67 0.13 0.02 5.9 1.5
globPC-detr -0.02 0.94 0.89 0.62 0.70 0.17 0.06 5.8 1.4
LRR-detr -0.02 0.75 0.52 0.38 0.73 0.12 0.00 5.4 1.4
M3toGDP-HP -0.04 0.63 0.42 0.34 0.81 0.11 -0.01 4.5 1.2
globM1-detr -0.04 0.40 0.20 0.19 1.00 0.14 0.03 3.6 1.0
M3toGDP-detr -0.05 0.23 0.20 0.21 1.10 0.07 -0.04 4.2 0.9
Table 9: θ =0 .4, average results over all countries, Low-Cost Booms.
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A+B diﬀprob ALT pers.
called
QAAPNtoGDP-HP 0.27 1.00 0.90 0.14 0.16 0.50 0.37 6.0 6.4
QAAPR-yoy 0.26 1.00 1.00 0.23 0.23 0.41 0.28 6.0 4.4
QAAPR-HP 0.25 1.00 0.80 0.11 0.14 0.60 0.47 6.0 7.1
LRR-lev 0.23 1.00 0.96 0.25 0.26 0.36 0.23 5.9 3.8
globSR-detr 0.23 1.00 0.98 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.23 6.0 3.6
QEPNtoGDP-HP 0.22 1.00 0.93 0.25 0.27 0.38 0.25 6.0 3.8
QAAPR-cum 0.21 1.00 0.93 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.21 6.0 3.4
SRR-lev 0.21 0.93 0.78 0.17 0.22 0.38 0.26 5.5 4.5
QEPR-HP 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.18 6.0 3.0
GDPR-HP 0.18 0.98 0.85 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.21 6.0 3.2
shock-GlobalPC 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.17 6.0 2.7
M1-yoy 0.18 0.93 0.58 0.09 0.16 0.53 0.40 5.3 6.2
M1-cum 0.17 0.93 0.60 0.11 0.19 0.53 0.40 5.3 5.4
QEPR-detr 0.17 1.00 1.00 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.17 6.0 2.6
QEPR-cum 0.16 1.00 0.98 0.38 0.39 0.29 0.16 6.0 2.6
INVtoGDP-HP 0.16 1.00 0.93 0.35 0.38 0.28 0.15 6.0 2.6
SRN-lev 0.16 0.93 0.65 0.17 0.25 0.41 0.28 5.5 3.9
M1toGDP-detr 0.15 0.93 0.60 0.14 0.24 0.38 0.25 5.3 4.2
M1toGDP-HP 0.15 1.00 0.64 0.17 0.27 0.41 0.28 5.6 3.7
globPC-HP 0.15 0.93 0.45 0.05 0.11 0.82 0.69 4.0 9.1
shock-GlobalM3 0.14 0.93 0.58 0.15 0.25 0.37 0.25 5.3 4.0
QEPR-yoy 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.43 0.26 0.13 6.0 2.3
globSR-HP 0.14 1.00 0.82 0.32 0.39 0.28 0.15 5.9 2.5
shock-M3 0.13 0.86 0.66 0.22 0.33 0.28 0.16 4.4 3.0
LRN-lev 0.13 0.93 0.65 0.22 0.33 0.32 0.19 5.5 3.0
QRPR-sa-detr 0.13 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.46 0.25 0.12 6.0 2.2
QAAPNtoGDP-detr 0.12 0.48 0.46 0.11 0.23 0.67 0.54 2.0 4.3
QRPR-detr 0.12 1.00 0.95 0.43 0.46 0.25 0.12 5.9 2.2
shock-M1 0.11 0.79 0.39 0.07 0.18 0.39 0.27 3.9 5.5
CONS-yoy 0.11 0.79 0.33 0.03 0.10 0.49 0.38 3.1 10.1
QAAPR-detr 0.11 1.00 1.00 0.48 0.48 0.24 0.11 6.0 2.1
GDPR-detr 0.11 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.49 0.24 0.11 6.0 2.1
QRPR-cum 0.11 1.00 0.87 0.40 0.46 0.25 0.12 6.0 2.2
QEPNtoGDP-detr 0.11 1.00 0.99 0.49 0.49 0.24 0.11 6.0 2.0
QRPR-sa-cum 0.10 1.00 0.87 0.42 0.48 0.26 0.13 6.0 2.1
QRPR-yoy 0.10 1.00 0.85 0.40 0.47 0.28 0.15 6.0 2.1
CPI-yoy 0.09 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.20 0.37 0.25 0.4 5.0
QRPR-sa-HP 0.09 1.00 0.68 0.30 0.44 0.25 0.12 6.0 2.3
QRPR-sa-yoy 0.09 1.00 0.85 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.14 6.0 2.1
globSR-lev 0.09 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.22 0.37 0.24 0.4 4.5
HINVtoGDP-HP 0.09 0.79 0.79 0.38 0.48 0.20 0.07 4.7 2.1
QRPN-satoGDP-HP 0.09 0.86 0.60 0.25 0.42 0.23 0.11 5.1 2.4
globM3-HP 0.08 0.79 0.33 0.08 0.25 0.33 0.20 3.1 4.0
SRR-detr 0.08 1.00 0.79 0.39 0.50 0.24 0.11 6.0 2.0
QRPR-HP 0.08 1.00 0.98 0.52 0.53 0.22 0.09 6.0 1.9
INV-yoy 0.08 0.98 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.31 0.18 4.4 2.6
CONS-cum 0.08 0.79 0.26 0.04 0.16 0.39 0.28 2.4 6.1
INV-cum 0.08 0.98 0.95 0.51 0.53 0.22 0.09 6.0 1.9
spread-lev 0.07 0.93 0.47 0.19 0.41 0.27 0.14 5.6 2.5
QRPN-satoGDP-detr 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.55 0.22 0.09 6.0 1.8
QRPNtoGDP-HP 0.07 0.86 0.73 0.37 0.50 0.21 0.09 5.1 2.0
QRPNtoGDP-detr 0.06 1.00 0.97 0.54 0.56 0.22 0.09 6.0 1.8
CPI-cum 0.06 0.07 0.33 0.12 0.35 0.28 0.16 0.4 2.8
HINV-cum 0.05 0.86 0.62 0.33 0.54 0.20 0.07 5.1 1.9
HINV-yoy 0.04 0.79 0.65 0.37 0.56 0.18 0.05 4.7 1.8
LRN-HP 0.03 1.00 0.87 0.53 0.61 0.20 0.07 6.0 1.6
HINVtoGDP-detr 0.03 1.00 0.61 0.36 0.60 0.21 0.08 5.7 1.7
REX-cum 0.03 0.64 0.48 0.28 0.58 0.23 0.09 2.5 1.7
DCNtoGDP-HP 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.51 0.04 -0.09 1.3 2.0
PCR-yoy 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.12 0.54 0.03 0.01 1.3 1.8
SRR-HP 0.01 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.53 0.04 -0.09 1.3 1.9
REX-yoy 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.01 0.4 3.5
globM1-HP 0.01 0.79 0.59 0.37 0.63 0.16 0.03 4.4 1.6
LRR-HP 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.28 0.06 0.04 0.6 3.5
PCR-cum 0.01 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.61 0.03 0.01 1.3 1.6
REX-detr 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.56 0.03 0.01 1.3 1.8
DCR-cum 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.4 1.7
DCR-yoy 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.61 0.01 0.00 0.4 1.6
REX-HP 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.60 0.03 -0.10 0.4 1.7
SRN-HP 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.66 0.02 0.00 0.9 1.5
shock-PC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.0
M3-cum 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.75 0.01 -0.01 0.4 1.3
M3-yoy 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.74 0.03 0.01 0.7 1.4
CONStoGDP-detr -0.01 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.74 0.02 -0.11 0.9 1.4
CONStoGDP-HP -0.01 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.75 0.02 -0.11 0.9 1.3
shock-GlobalM1 -0.01 0.07 0.23 0.18 0.76 0.15 0.02 0.4 1.3
-spread-lev -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.97 0.01 -0.12 0.4 1.0
INVtoGDP-detr -0.01 1.00 0.93 0.65 0.69 0.18 0.05 6.0 1.4
SRN-detr -0.01 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.84 0.03 -0.10 0.9 1.2
DCNtoGDP-detr -0.03 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.88 0.03 -0.10 1.3 1.1
LRN-detr -0.04 1.00 0.87 0.64 0.73 0.17 0.04 6.0 1.4
LRR-detr -0.04 1.00 0.72 0.54 0.75 0.16 0.03 5.6 1.3
PCNtoGDP-HP -0.04 0.21 0.21 0.22 1.00 0.03 -0.10 1.3 1.0
globM3-detr -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.13 0.0
M3toGDP-HP -0.07 1.00 0.47 0.44 0.93 0.14 0.01 4.0 1.1
M3toGDP-detr -0.08 0.07 0.07 0.17 2.41 0.01 -0.12 0.4 0.4
globM1-detr -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.13 0.0
globPC-detr -0.08 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.16 0.03 6.0 1.2
PCNtoGDP-detr -0.10 0.21 0.21 0.31 1.44 0.03 -0.10 1.3 0.7
Table 10: θ =0 .4, weighted-average results over EA countries, Low-Cost Booms.
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